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THE BUDGET  DEFICIT of the federal government has emerged as a cen- 
tral focus in American  public  policy debate,  attracting  anxious  attention 
from a variety  of constituencies.  The left now raises the specter  of en- 
larged  deficits  in opposition  to the  increasingly  audible  calls  for tax reduc- 
tion, while the right  continues  to cite the same  threat  against  new govern- 
ment  spending  initiatives.  In either  case  the presumption  of ill effects  from 
a sustained  deficit  is an essential  underpinning  of the argument.  The eco- 
nomic consequences  of government  deficits-usually alleged  to be either 
inflationary  (in the sense of raising  prices), or deflationary  (in the sense 
of depressing  investment  and hence economic  growth), or both-today 
appear  with unaccustomed  urgency  in discussions  of hitherto  unexciting 
policy issues. Several state legislatures  have proposed a constitutional 
amendment  prohibiting  the federal  government  from  spending  beyond  its 
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Table  1.  Receipts  and  Expenditures  of the  Federal  Government  and  as Percentage 
of Gross  National  Product,  1946-77 
Amount  (billions  of dollars)  Percent  of GNP 
Calendar  Expendi-  Surplus  Expendi-  Surplus 
year  Receipts  tures  or deficit  Receipts  tures  or defiit 
1946  39.1  35.6  3.5  18.7  17.0  1.7 
1947  43.2  29.8  13.4  18.6  12.8  5.8 
1948  43.2  34.9  8.3  16.7  13.5  3.2 
1949  38.7  41.3  -2.6  15.0  16.0  -1.0 
1950  50.0  40.8  9.2  17.5  14.3  3.2 
1951  64.3  57.8  6.5  19.5  17.5  2.0 
1952  67.3  71.1  -3.7  19.4  20.5  -1.1 
1953  70.0  77.1  -7.1  19.1  21.1  -2.0 
1954  63.7  69.8  -6.0  17.4  19.1  -1.7 
1955  72.6  68.1  4.4  18.2  17.1  1.1 
1956  78.0  71.9  6.1  18.5  17.1  1.4 
1957  81.9  79.6  2.3  18.5  18.0  0.5 
1958  78.7  88.9  -10.3  17.5  19.8  -2.3 
1959  89.8  91.0  -1.1  18.5  18.7  -0.2 
1960  96.1  93.1  3.0  19.0  18.4  0.6 
1961  98.1  101.9  -3.9  18.7  19.5  -0.7 
1962  106.2  110.4  -4.2  18.8  19.6  -0.8 
1963  114.4  114.2  0.3  19.2  19.2  0.0 
1964  114.9  118.2  -3.3  18.1  18.6  -0.5 
1965  124.3  123.8  0.5  18.1  18.0  0.1 
1966  141.8  143.6  -1.8  18.8  19.1  -0.2 
1967  150.5  163.7  -13.2  18.9  20.6  -1.7 
1968  174.7  180.6  -5.8  20.1  20.8  -0.7 
1969  197.0  188.4  8.5  21.1  20.1  0.9 
1970  192.1  204.2  -12.1  19.6  20.8  -1.2 
1971  198.6  220.6  -22.0  18.7  20.7  -2.1 
1972  227.5  244.7  -17.3  19.4  20.9  -1.5 
1973  257.9  264.8  -6.9  19.8  20.3  -0.5 
1974  288.6  299.3  -10.7  20.5  21.2  -0.8 
1975  286.2  356.8  -70.6  18.8  23.4  -4.6 
1976  331.4  385.2  -53.8  19.5  22.7  -3.2 
1977  374.5  422.6  -48.1  19.8  22.4  -2.6 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, national income and product accounts data. 
receipts. In 1976 the victorious Democratic presidential candidate cam- 
paigned on a pledge to balance the government budget by 1980. 
Even a cursory look at the relevant historical data (see table 1)  sug- 
gests why  the furor has recently intensified so  sharply. Since the mid- 
1970s the federal government's excess of expenditures over receipts has Benjamin  M. Friedman  595 
strayed widely from the predominant  pattern, experienced  during the 
previous  quarter  century,  of typically  modest  deficits  that become  some- 
what less modest during  recessions.  As the U.S. economy sustained  its 
most severe  downturn  since the 1930s, the deficit  quickly  rose to a post- 
war record  level-both  as a dollar magnitude  and, more  importantly,  in 
relation  to the underlying  scale of economic  activity.  Even now that the 
economy  has regained  an activity  rate about  consistent  with  many  econo- 
mists'  estimates  of the "nonaccelerating-inflation  rate  of unemployment," 
the deficit  remains  above 2 percent  of the gross  national  product.  More- 
over, campaign  rhetoric  to the contrary,  there  is little if any prospect  of 
balancing  the budget  by the end of the decade. 
Although the events surrounding  the growing controversy  over the 
government's  budget  deficit  are  sufficiently  clear,  there  is not much  agree- 
ment on the reasons  why deficits  are to be opposed. Several  years ago, 
when a simple  version  of monetarism  had its greatest  hold on the think- 
ing of decisionmakers  in business  and public policy, the reasoning  was 
that deficits  led to excessive  money  creation,  which  in turn  raised  prices. 
Once the huge deficits  of 1975 and 1976 failed to elicit a comparable 
bulge in monetary  growth,  however, attention  turned to the effects of 
deficits  financed  not by money  but  by issuing  interest-bearing  government 
debt. Since then most discussions  of the subject  have typically  stemmed 
from  either  or both of two propositions  about  debt-financed  deficits. 
The first  proposition  is that  even debt-financed  deficits  are  inflationary 
because what matters  for prices is not only the money stock but some 
combination  of money  plus the outstanding  interest-bearing  government 
debt (or perhaps  merely  the short-term  component  of that  debt). In other 
words, according  to this view, the stock of "money"  that determines 
prices  is really  an "effective  money"  that includes  instruments  other  than 
deposits and currency,  and perhaps combines them with weights not 
restricted  to zeroes or ones. Although years ago some economists  ad- 
vanced "total liquid asset" theories  of income determination,'  recently 
this idea has not attracted  much  attention  in the academic  literature.2 
1. See,  for  example, John G.  Gurley, "The Radcliffe Report and Evidence," 
American Economic Review, vol. 50 (September 1960), pp. 672-700. 
2.  It is important  to realize that a money-plus-bonds  theory of nominal income 
(or price inflation) is not the same as a monetary theory of nominal income. For 
example, the growth of the narrowly defined money stock (currency plus demand 
deposits, M1) has increased from 4.1 percent in 1975 to 7.9 percent during 1977, in 
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The second  proposition,  which  is the focus of attention  in this article, 
is that  debt-financed  deficits  "crowd  out"  interest-sensitive,  private-sector 
spending-in  particular,  investment  in homes and in new productive 
capacity.  Such  a result,  if true,  would  highlight  two serious  drawbacks  to 
the traditional  Keynesian  notion  of using  deficit-causing  fiscal  policy as a 
stimulus  of economic  activity.  That result  would reduce (perhaps  elimi- 
nate) the potency  of fiscal  policy for such stimulative  purposes  because 
government  spending  (or private  spending  induced  by increased  transfers 
or reduced  taxes) would  substitute  for rather  than  add  to private  spending 
that  would otherwise  take  place. And it would  create  a trade-off  between 
any remaining  short-run  advantages  of income  expansion  and the longer 
run  benefits  of productivity  and growth  associated  especially  with  invest- 
ment in new plant and equipment.  The "crowding  out" aspects  of debt- 
financed  fiscal  policy  have  undergone  substantial  analysis  in the academic 
literature  and have received  widespread  attention  in the financial  press 
and, more generally,  among  the government  and business  communities. 
Discussion  along these lines abated  somewhat  after  interest  rates  on pri- 
vate borrowing  failed to rise during  1975 and 1976, but debate  has re- 
cently intensified  again,  primarily  because  the deficit  has remained  large 
and fixed  investment  has been slow to regain  vigor  during  the subsequent 
recovery.  Fuller employment  of the economy's  resources  and continuing 
large  deficits  are  generating  increasing  concern  that  the crowding  out that 
failed  to materialize  in 1975-76 could  be a major  problem  in 1979-80. 
In discussions  of fiscal policy the term "crowding  out" has several 
diverse meanings.  Economists  have long agreed that, if the supply of 
goods and services  is fixed  and  resources  fully employed,  the government 
can claim  more  of the economy's  output  only  by depriving  the private  sec- 
tor of its use. Wholly  apart  from  financial  effects,  in this  case  the crowding 
out of real private  spending  by price  inflation  (sometimes  called "forced 
saving"), for example,  is well recognized.  Conversely,  if resources  are 
unemployed,  by increasing  utilization  levels government  spending  can 
stimulate  investment  in productive  capacity and thereby  increase real 
the stock of money plus outstanding  treasury  bills grew by 12.2 percent in 1974 but 
only 4.6 percent in  1977, in comparison to its previous five-year average annual 
growth rate of 7.5 percent. Hence inferences drawn from a policy prescription  of 
controlling money plus treasury bills would have diverged widely from inferences 
drawn  from a policy of controlling  money. Benjamin  M. Friedman  597 
private  spending  also. Such increases  can follow, for example,  from the 
response  of the demand  for capital  stock to the observed  or expected  de- 
mand for final product, and the Congressional  Budget Office has de- 
scribed such accelerator-based effects as "crowding  in."3  Both these argu- 
ments for crowding  out or crowding  in focus in the first instance on 
real-sector  effects  associated  with  the additional  government  spending  and 
not on the means  of financing  that  spending.  Indeed,  the direction  of these 
effects  follows even if the additional  spending  is financed  by taxes. 
By contrast,  much  of the recent  interest  in the possibility  of crowding 
out has explicitly  focused  not merely  on deficit  spending  but more  specifi- 
cally, given  the experience  of the mid-1970s,  on deficits  financed  by issu- 
ing interest-bearing  debt rather  than money. The literature  to date has 
distinguished  two different  ways in which such "financial  crowding  out" 
can occur: one associated  with the demand  for money for transactions 
purposes, and one with wealth effects on portfolio behavior.  In either 
case, "financial  crowding out" can take place independently  of "real 
crowding  out,"  and  therefore  can occur  even if the economy  is at less than 
full employment.  Hence the financial  crowding  out potentially  represents 
an even stronger  argument  against  deficit  spending  for expansionary  pur- 
poses. It is primarily  the effect associated  with financing  the government 
deficit, especially the presumed consequences  for private investment 
spending,  that has recently  attracted  so much attention. 
The objective  of this article  is to show that the prevailing  view of the 
economic  consequences  of financing  government  deficits,  as expressed  in 
recent  economic  literature  and policy debates,  reflects  serious  misunder- 
standings.  Debt-financed  deficits  need not crowd  out any private  invest- 
ment, and may even crowd  in some. And the reasons  for this underscore 
the potential importance  of a policy tool that economists  both in and 
out of  government  have largely neglected for over a decade-debt- 
management  policy. To focus sharply  on financial  crowding  out and  keep 
it separate  from  the undisputed  phenomena  in the  real  sector  noted  above, 
this analysis  assumes  that there are unemployed  resources  in the econ- 
omy and  disregards  any  accelerator  effects. 
The first  section  examines  both analytically  and  empirically  the "trans- 
actions crowding  out" associated  since Hicks with the slope of the LM 
3.  Congressional Budget Office, Inflation and Unemployment:  A Report on the 
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curve.4  This section reviews  the familiar  IS-LM model and the existing 
econometric  evidence  on the slope of the LM curve.  In interpreting  this 
evidence the discussion  raises the question of whether  the potency of 
short-run  crowding  out tends to be overstated  by a failure  to distinguish 
among  the several  different  interest  rates  central  to the IS-LM  model. 
The second section addresses  the "portfolio  crowding  out" empha- 
sized by Milton Friedman,6  and to date most rigorously  analyzed  by 
Blinder  and Solow and by Tobin and Buiter.8  Using a model including 
three assets-money,  government  bonds, and real capital-the  analysis 
shows  that  even the sign of the portfolio  effect  of bond  issuing  on private 
investment  depends  on the relative substitutabilities  among these three 
assets  in the public's  aggregate  portfolio.  The well-known  Blinder-Solow 
analysis,  with its presumption  of a negative  effect, is simply  the special 
case associated  with the arbitrary  (and rather  implausible)  assumption 
that government  bonds and real capital  are perfect  substitutes.  Because 
the question  of whether  or not the demand  for money depends  on port- 
folio wealth  has become  a key issue  in assessing  the empirical  importance 
of portfolio  crowding  out, this section  also presents  econometric  evidence 
indicating  that money demand  does indeed depend  on wealth as well as 
income-in  other  words,  that  people  hold money  balances  for both trans- 
actions  and  portfolio  reasons.  In addition,  the discussion  digresses  briefly 
to show that including  wealth in the money-demand  function  makes a 
large contribution  to solving Goldfeld's  missing  money mystery,  as well 
as to explaining  Hamburger's  proposed  solution.7 
The third  section  extends  the model  of portfolio  crowding  out to show 
that  the crucial  substitutabilities  that  make  the difference  between  crowd- 
ing out and crowding  in are determined  in part by the government's 
choice of debt instrument  for financing  the deficit.  Hence  when  monetary 
4.  J.  R.  Hicks, "Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics'; A  Suggested Interpretation," 
Econometrica,  vol. 5 (April 1937), pp. 147-59. 
5.  See Friedman's  response to Tobin in "Comments  on the Critics,"  Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 80 (September-October  1972), pp. 906-50. 
6.  Alan S. Blinder and Robert M. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?"  Journal 
of Public Economics, vol. 2 (November 1973), pp. 319-37; James  Tobin and Willem 
Buiter, "Long-Run  Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand," 
in Jerome L. Stein, ed., Monetarism (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976; distributor, 
American Elsevier), pp. 273-309. 
7.  Stephen M. Goldfeld, 'The Case of the Missing Money,"  BPEA, 3:1976,  pp. 
683-730;  Michael J.  Hamburger, "Behavior of  the  Money  Stock:  Is  There  a 
Puzzle?"  Journal of Monetary  Economics, vol. 3 (July 1977), pp. 265-88. Benjamin  M. Friedman  599 
policy is unaccommodative,  within limits debt-management  policy can 
take its place in augmenting  the potency  of stimulative  fiscal  policy or in 
improving  the otherwise  fixed trade-off  between short-run  stimulation 
and investment  for long-run  growth. 
A final section  summarizes  the implications  of these  findings  for fiscal, 
monetary,  and debt-management  policies. 
Transactions  Crowding  Out 
The transactions  crowding  out associated  with a government  deficit 
financed  by issuing nonmoney  claims has been a standard  part of the 
Keynesian  fiscal policy analysis  at least since Hicks' formalization  of it 
in the IS-LM model. In increasing  the level of economic activity, the 
spending  increase  (or tax cut) that leads to the deficit  also increases  the 
demand  for money  for transactions  purposes.  If the supply  of money  re- 
mains  fixed, and if the money  market  is to clear,  then some other  factor 
must generate  a precisely offsetting  decrease  in money demand.  If the 
public's demand  for money balances  is sensitive  to the rate of interest 
because of portfolio considerations  or simply  because  of the inventory- 
theoretic  considerations  applied  to transactions  balances  by Baumol  and 
Tobin,8  the required  offset  for money  demand  is brought  about  by an in- 
crease  in "the interest  rate"  earned  by nonmoney  claims.  However,  be- 
cause aggregate  private  spending  depends  negatively  on the interest  rate, 
the increase  in the interest  rate that clears  the money  market  also erodes 
some of the income-expansionary  effect  of the initial  fiscal  policy action. 
THE  IS-LM  MODEL  WITHOUT  WEALTH  EFFECTS 
Briefly retracing  transactions  crowding  out in terms of the standard 
Hicks  IS-LM  model  will be useful  both  to facilitate  a discussion  of empiri- 
cal magnitudes  and to motivate the subsequent  analysis of portfolio 
crowding  out. 
In linear form, the static equilibrium  version  of the underlying  model 
8. William J. Baumol, "The  Transactions  Demand for Cash: An Inventory  Theo- 
retic Approach," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 66 (November 1952), pp. 
545-56; James Tobin, "The Interest-Elasticity  of Transactions Demand for Cash," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 38 (August 1956), pp. 241-47. 600  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
includes  a goods market  consisting  of a consumption  function,  an invest- 
ment function (without accelerator  effects),  and a  spending-income 
identity' 
(1)  C=co+c1(Y-T),  0<C1< 
(2)  I =  io  +  ilr,  il < 0 
(3)  Y=C+I+G. 
It also includes  a money  market  consisting  of a money-demand  function 
and a market-clearing  equilibrium  condition 
(4)  MD  =  mO +  mlY +  m2r,  ml  >  0  > m2 
(5)  MD =  M, 
where 
C =  private consumption spending 
G =  government purchases of goods and services 
I  =  private investment spending 
MD =  demand for money 
M  =  supply of money 
r =  "the  interest  rate"  on nonmoney  claims 
T =  taxes 
Y =  income  (total spending). 
Given  unemployed  resources,  there  is no representation  of supply  in the 
goods market,  and goods prices are held constant  and (for simplicity) 
normalized  to unity. 
When G, T, and M are treated  as exogenous,  equations  1 through  5 
suffice  to determine  C, I, MD, r, and Y. The more  compact  IS-LM  form 
of the model follows from solving 1 through  3 into a goods-market  equi- 
librium  or IS curve  relating  Y and  r, 
(6)  _  ~~~~co+  io  c1T +  G  +(i1)  (6)  Y =  c+  cT+G+  (  i)r, 
9.  Here, as well as elsewhere in this article, lowercase letters with subscripts  are 
fixed coefficients  in equations  for economic variables indicated  by the corresponding 
uppercase  letters.  For example, co and cl are the coefficients  in the consumption  func- 
tion C; io and il are the coefficients  in the investment function L.  This convention is 
especially useful in the more complicated asset-demand  systems that appear in the 
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and likewise solving 4 and 5 into a money-market  equilibrium  or LM 
curve, 
(7)  Y  M-mo  n2r 
Because  the IS curve  relates  Y negatively  to r while  the LM curve  relates 
Y positively  to r, except  for pathological  values  the model  yields general 
equilibrium  in the (r, Y)  space as shown in the diagram  below by the 
intersection  of curves  IS0 and  LMo  conditional  on values  Go,  To,  and Mo. 
In the absence  of any crowding  out, the effect  on Y of an increase  in G 
would  be, from  equation  6, simply  the  partial  derivative 
dY  1  (8)  dG  - 
that  is, the familiar  "consumption  multiplier."  The diagram  indicates  this 
dependence  of Y on G in the goods market  alone by the rightward  shift 
from curve  IS, conditional  on Go  to curve  IS, conditional  on G1.  In place 
of the original  equilibrium  value Y10,  the partial  equilibrium,  conditional 
on holding  the interest  rate constant  at r0,  is Y' >  Y0.  Because  the pair 
(YO,  r0) satisfied  the money-market  equilibrium  condition  and because 
Y' =A  YO,  however,  the pair (Y', r0) cannot also satisfy that condition. 
Hence the point (Y', r0), which  lies to the right  of the LM curve  in the 
diagram,  is not a point  of general  equilibrium. 
To find the general equilibrium  it is necessary  to solve the IS-LM 
model  of 6 and  7 for its reduced-form  equation  for Y as 
(m2cO +  m2io -  ilmO)  -  m2clT  +  ilM +  m2G 
m2(1  -ci)  + iimi 
Thus the relevant  total derivative  expresses  the effect  of G on Y as 
(10)  ~~dY  _m2 
(10)  dG  m2(1 -  cl)  +  i1m1 
Because the denominator  of 10 is unambiguously  negative and the in- 
terest  elasticity  m2  is nonpositive,  the effect  is positive  as expected.  More- 
over, 10 clearly  indicates  two important  aspects  of transactions  crowding 
out. First, if m2  =  0  (that is, if money demand  is interest  inelastic), G 
has no effect on Y. In graphical  terms,  7 implies  a vertical  LM curve  at 602  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
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Y  M  -m/mm  if m2 =  0, so that the only consequence  of shifting  ISo 
to IS, is a higher  interest  rate. 
Second, given m2 #7 0  (and given the other coefficient  signs noted 
above), the total derivative  in 10 is strictly  less than  the partial  derivative 
in 8 as long as 4, &  0 (that  is, investment  is interest  sensitive) and  ml .#  0 
(that is, money  demand  does depend  on income,  so that the constant  in- 
terest rate leading to Y' in the diagram  does not obtain). In graphical 
terms,  the general  equilibrium  value Y1  associated  with  the intersection  of 
LMo and IS, must  be strictly  greater  than YO  but less than Y' as long as 
the IS curve  is nonvertical  and  the LM curve  is nonhorizontal.  Solving  the 
model  for the corresponding  reduced-form  equation  for r, 
-[mO(l  -  c)  +  mi(co  +  io)] -  mllT  +  (1 -  cO)M -  m1G 
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Table  2.  Estimates  of Interest  and  Income  Elasticities  from Various  Versions 
of the  IS-LM  Model 
Type  of elasticity  and  version  of 
model  Short-run  value  Long-run  value 
Interest  elasticity  of real  spending 
Friedman  -0.0948  -0.173 
Income  elasticity  of money  demandb 
Goldfeld (M1)  0.193  0.682 
Friedman  (M2)  0.362  1.18 
Hamburger  (M1)  0.110  1.00 
Interest  elasticity  of money  demand" 
Goldfeld (M1)  -0.064  -0.226 
Friedman  (M2)  -0.0512  -0.166 
Hamburger  (M1)  -0.074  -0.673 
Sources:  Derived  from models presented  in the following  papers:  Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "The  In. 
efficiency  of Short-Run  Monetary  Targets  for Monetary  Policy,"  BPEA,  2:1977,  pp. 293-335;  Stephen  M. 
Goldfeld.  "The  Demand  for Money  Revisited,"  BPEA,  3:1973,  pp. 577-638;  and Michael  J. Hamburger. 
"Behavior  of the Money  Stock:  Is There  a Puzzle?"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol. 3 (July 1977). 
pp. 265-88. 
a. Taken  from  the directly  estimated  IS curve  in the Pirandello  model  which  I presented  In an earlier 
paper  (Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "The  Inefficiency  of Short-Run  Monetary  Targets  for Monetary  Policy," 
BPEA,  2:1977,  pp.  293-335).  In estimating  this  model  I used  an instrumental-variables  procedure  to derive 
consistent  estimators  given  the endogeneity  of both Y  and  r. 
b. Mi indicates  that  money  demand  was  measured  by currency  plus  demand  deposits;  Ms  models  used 
Mi plus time  deposits  at commercial  banks  except  negotiable  certificates  of deposit  of $100,000  or more. 
actions  crowding  out-that  is, the ratio  of the total derivative  in 10 to the 
partial  derivative  in 8. 
For purposes of estimating  the magnitude  of transactions  crowding 
out it is essential  to coordinate  the interest  rate used to measure  the in- 
terest  elasticity  of money demand  with that used to measure  the interest 
elasticity  of spending.  Otherwise  the implied  IS and LM curves  exist on 
graphs  with  different  vertical  axes,11  and  their  relative  slopes  are  not com- 
parable.  Although  the simplified  IS-LM model usually  refers  to "the  in- 
terest rate" on nonmoney  claims, in fact the yields earned  on different 
claims behave differently.  Moreover,  it is well known that the interest 
elasticity  estimated  for the money-demand  function  typically  depends  on 
which  interest  rate(s) the equation  includes.  Specifically,  money  demand 
nearly  always  shows a small elasticity  with respect  to short-term  interest 
rates-for  example,  the yields on time deposits  and commercial  paper  as 
in the Goldfeld  equation,  or the yield on treasury  bills as in the  Pirandello 
11. Analogously, if there were some shift in the relationship  between income and 
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and examining  the total  derivative, 
(12)  dr  -Mc1)  +  ilm1 
confirms  that the reason  for Y1 <  Y' is a rise in the interest  rate from 
ro  to rl. 
EMPIRICAL  MAGNITUDES  AND  SOME  MULTIPLE-ASSET 
IMPLICATIONS 
How important  is transactions  crowding  out likely to be in practice? 
The answer  most frequently  given  invokes  econometric  evidence  indicat- 
ing a relatively  steep  LM curve-that is, a relatively  small  interest  sensi- 
tivity of money demand-to  conclude  that transactions  crowding  out is 
likely to be large in comparison  with the effect of the underlying  fiscal 
action. On closer inspection,  however,  this answer  turns  out to depend 
primarily  on a failure  to distinguish  among  the yields  on distinct  kinds  of 
nonmoney  claims. 
Table 2 summarizes  some short- and long-run  parameter  estimates, 
drawn  from several  sources,  that are relevant  for calculating  the implied 
magnitude  of transactions  crowding  out.10  In all cases the underlying 
equations  have been estimated  (for quarterly  data) in logarithmic  form, 
so that they can be directly  interpreted  in terms  of percentage  changes; 
conversion  to dollar  magnitudes  in turn  depends  on the base chosen. 
Table  3 presents  a set of calculations,  based  on the parameter  estimates 
in table 2, of the effectiveness  of fiscal  policy after allowing  for transac- 
tions crowding  out. The summary  statistic  shown  is the ratio of the gen- 
eral equilibrium  effect  of debt-financed  government  spending  on income, 
including  the allowance  for transactions  crowding  out, to the correspond- 
ing partial-equilibrium,  "goods-market-only"  effect,  excluding  any trans- 
10. Alternative, but also less transparent,  ways of calculating this magnitude  in- 
clude simulating large nonlinear econometric models and estimating direct reduced 
forms. See, for example, Franco Modigliani and Albert Ando, "Impacts  of Fiscal 
Actions on Aggregate Income and the Monetarist Controversy: Theory and Evi- 
dence," in Stein, Monetarism, pp. 17-42; and Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. 
Jordan, "Monetary  and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance  in Eco- 
nomic Stabilization,"  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 50 (Novem- 
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Table  3. Estimates  of the  Effecdveness  of Fiscal  Poilcy  after  Allowance  for 
Transactions  Crowding  Out 
Money-demand 
functions  Short-run  valueb  Long-run  valueb 
Goldfeld  (M,)  0.930  0.657 
Friedman  (M2)  0.849  0.448 
Hamburger  (M,)  0.876  0.796 
Sources: Estimated from text equations 8 and 10 and data in table 2. In all three sets of calculations the 
interest elasticity of spending is taken from the Pirandello model. 
a.  For explanation of the functions, see table 2 sources and notes. 
b. Ratio of the total derivative in text equation 10 to the partial derivative in text equation 8. See dis- 
cussion of table in text. 
model. Conversely,  money  demand  generally  shows  a large  elasticity  with 
respect  to long-term  interest  rates;  an example  is the yields on long-term 
government  bonds and equities,  as in the Hamburger  equation. 
In comparing  one long-run  equilibrium  with another,  it is plausible  to 
assume  that  alternative  nonmoney  claims  will exhibit  identical  movements 
in yields-apart  from the important  portfolio  effects emphasized  in the 
next section-so  that  this  coordination  problem  does  not arise  in calculat- 
ing the magnitude  of long-run  transactions  crowding  out. In the short  run, 
however,  the typical experience  is that interest  rates on long-term  non- 
money  claims  are  less volatile  than  those  on short-term  nonmoney  claims. 
The diagram  below illustrates  the implication  of this distinction  for the 
calculation  of the magnitude  of short-run  transactions  crowding  out by 
plotting  two LM curves,  LMO(rL)  and  LMO(rs), which  relate  money  de- 
mand  to long-term  and  short-term  interest  rates,  respectively.  The  IS curves 
in the diagram,  ISO  and  IS,, both  relate  spending  to long-term  interest  rates 
because  the interest  rate  used to estimate  the interest  elasticity  of spend- 
ing shown  in table 2 and used in all the calculations  presented  in table 3 
is the yield on long-term  corporate  bonds.12 The correct  short-run  effect 
of the fiscal policy that shifts ISO  to IS1 is to raise income from YO  to Y1, 
the intersection of the mutually consistent ISl(rL)  and LMO(rL).  Because 
12. The usual argument for relating real spending to long-term interest rates is 
that, for reasons related to risk aversion, businesses tend to finance investment in 
plant and equipment  with long-term  liabilities, and households generally  finance  resi- 
dential construction with long-term liabilities. For an argument that investment in- 
stead depends on a kind of short-term  yield (though not on the measured yield on 
short-term assets like deposits or commercial paper), see Robert E. Hall, "Invest- 
ment, Interest Rates, and the Effects of Stabilization Policies," BPEA, 1: 1977, pp. 
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LMO(rg) is steeper  than LMG(rL), the point Y" at which IS,(rL)  and 
LMO(r8) intersect  underestimates  the effectiveness  of fiscal  policy in the 
presence  of transactions  crowding  out. 
The equations  in both the Goldfeld and the Pirandello  models relate 
money demand  to short-term  interest  rates, and thus are analogous  to 
curve  LM(r8,). Hence some correction  for the greater  volatility  of short- 
term interest rates is necessary to render the calculation of the magnitude 
of  short-run transactions crowding out comparable to point  Y1, rather 
than Y",  in the diagram. The  calculations reported in table 3 use  the 
Pirandello model's  term-structure equation for this purpose.13 By con- 
trast, Hamburger's equation relates money demand to long-term interest 
13. The  equation  plausibly  indicates  a 0.265  short-run  elasticity  of the long-term 
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rates, so that it is already  analogous  to curve  LMO(r,,), and hence with 
the IS(r,,)  slope yields the short-run  transactions  crowding  out effect 
directly. 
The first  pair of calculations  shown  in table 3 is based on Goldfeld's 
M,1  demand equation.  In the short run the LM curve adjusted  for the 
term  structure  is sufficiently  flat to offset  less than  one-tenth  of the effect 
on income (spending) associated  with  the rightward  shift  of the IS curve. 
In the long run the interest  elasticity  of money demand  increases  more 
than  does the income  elasticity,  and  the interest  elasticity  of spending  also 
becomes  greater.  Because  of the steeper  LM and flatter  IS curves,  in the 
long run transactions  crowding out offsets about one-third of the IS 
curve's rightward  shift. The second pair of calculations,  based on the 
Pirandello  model's  M2 equation,  indicates  a somewhat  greater  crowding 
out effect because of the larger estimated  income elasticity  of M2 de- 
mand.  Fixing  Ml is not the same  policy as fiing M2  when  their  respective 
income elasticities  differ-as  most empirical  estimates  indicate.  Finally, 
the pair of calculations  based  on Hamburger's  M1  demand  function  indi- 
cates  about  the same  amount  of crowding  out in the short  run,  but  notice- 
ably  less than  both the Goldfeld  and  Pirandello  equations  in the long run, 
primarily  because  of the large  estimated  long-run  interest  elasticity. 
All three calculations  reported  in table 3 indicate that transactions 
crowding  out offsets  only a small  part of the expansionary  effect  of gov- 
ernment  spending,  particularly  in the short run. A key reason for the 
contrast  between this result and the presumptions  based on notions of 
steepness  of the LM curve  probably  stems  from a failure  to consider  the 
implications  of the different  measured  elasticities  of money  demand  with 
respect  to short-  versus  long-term  interest  rates.1 In the long run,  trans- 
actions crowding  out is more powerful,  but even then one-half  or more 
of the expansionary  effect  remains. 
SUMMARY 
Several  useful  conclusions  emerge  from  a review  of the theory  and  evi- 
dence  pertaining  to transactions  crowding  out. 
There is  no  disagreement  that, with unaccommodative  monetary 
14. Without  the term-structure  correction  the short-run  estimates  in table 3 
would be 0.778 for Goldfeld's  equation  and 0.599 for the Pirandello  models 
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policy, transactions  crowding  out offsets  some part of the effect  of fiscal 
policy on income.  Only with a vertical  IS curve  will it offset  none of the 
effect,  and  only with a vertical  LM curve  will it offset  all of it. 
In the short  run the offset  is probably  small, say, of the order  of one- 
tenth;  in the long run it is almost certainly  greater,  say, of the order  of 
one-third  or more. 
Because  of the different  income  elasticities  of the public's  demands  for 
time  and  demand  deposits,  the offset  is greater  if monetary  policy  controls 
M2  than  if it controls  M1. 
Portfolio  Crowding  Effects15 
If transactions  crowding  out does not vitiate the intended  effect of a 
fiscal policy action accompanied  by unaccommodative  monetary  policy, 
the question of the potency of fiscal policy with a fixed money stock 
hinges (from a financial  perspective)  on portfolio  crowding  out. Here  the 
explicit  portfolio  effects  associated  with  financing  the deficit  (or disposing 
of a surplus) by issuing (or retiring) interest-bearing  government  debt 
assume  primary  importance.18  The underlying  mechanisms  are  both more 
complicated  and less familiar  than those that give rise to transactions 
crowding  out. Introducing  wealth  into the model  is an essential  first  step. 
Beyond  wealth  effects  per se, however,  it is necessary  to introduce  a more 
complete  representation  of the public's  asset-holding  preferences. 
It is an anomaly  that  the economic  consequences  of the resulting  port- 
folio effects  have come to be conventionally  known as crowding  out. In 
fact, the net result  may be either  crowding  out or crowding  in. In other 
words,  bond financing  of government  deficits  may either  increase  or de- 
crease private  investment  spending.  The incorrect  but nonetheless  cur- 
rently  widespread  view that a decrease  in investment  is the only possible 
result is due to the failure  to consider  adequately  the public's  portfolio 
15. Since writing this paper I have seen a paper by Cohen and McMenamin 
that overlaps some of the analysis of this section; see Darrel Cohen and J. Stuart 
McMenamin, "'The  Role of  Fiscal Policy in a Financially Disaggregated Macro- 
economic Model," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 10 (August 1978), 
pp. 322-36. 
16. Money, or the monetary base when it is distinguished  from money, also con- 
stitutes a part of the government's  debt. Unless specified to the contrary, however, 
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behavior.  Clearing  up this misunderstanding  is an important  precursor  to 
sensible  analysis  of fiscal  policy. 
CROWDING  OUT  OR  CROWDING  IN 
Wealth  effects  exert  important  and long-recognized  influences  on eco- 
nomic  behavior  in both the goods market  and  the asset  markets.  First,  in 
the goods market  the idea of positive  wealth  effects  on consumption  dates 
at least to Pigou, and Keynes argued  for an analogous  effect on invest- 
ment.17 More recently  Modigliani  and others have formalized  this rela- 
tionship  in the "life  cycle"  model, and  both  he and  Tobin  and  Dolde have 
elaborated  the associated  linkages  and  explored  the empirical  evidence.18 
For purposes  of the current  discussion  it is sufficient  simply  to use an IS 
curve  that  is analogous  to 6 but that  incorporates  the wealth  effects  oper- 
ating  within  the goods market, 
(13)  Y = yo +  y1G +  (1-yl)T  +  y2r +  y3W,  Y3 >  0  > Y2,  Yl  >, 
where  W  is total  real  wealth  held  by the  private  sector.'9 
A minimal  model for the analysis  of portfolio  crowding  out includes 
three  distinct  components  of private  wealth, 
(14)  W =  M +  B +  K, 
where 
M =  the money stock 
B =  the outstanding  stock of interest-bearing  (that is, nonmoney) 
government  bonds 
K =  the outstanding  stock of real  capital. 
The continued  assumption  of constancy  of goods prices (with the price 
17. A. C. Pigou, "The Value of Money," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
32  (November 1917),  pp. 38-65; John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt, Brace, 1936). 
18. Franco Modigliani, "Monetary Policy and Consumption: Linkages via In- 
terest Rate and Wealth Effects in the EMP Model," and James Tobin and Walter 
Dolde,  "Wealth, Liquidity and Consumption," both in  Consumer Spending and 
Monetary Policy:  The  Linkages, Proceedings of  a  Monetary Conference, 1971 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, n.d.), pp. 9-84  and 99-146, respectively. 
19. Like 6,  equation 13 exhibits a unit balanced-budget  multiplier; this result 
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level normalized  at unity) avoids  the need to distinguish  between  real  and 
nominal  magnitudes.20  The key source  of variation  of wealth  for purposes 
of the current  discussion  is the government  budget  constraint  emphasized 
by Christ  and  Silber,2' 
(15)  G-T=  dM+  dB. 
A useful simplifying  assumption  underlying  the (implicitly  one-period) 
static equilibrium  analysis, comparable  to that of the first section of 
this article,  is that the initial equilibrium  corresponding  to IS0  and LMo 
in the first  diagram  is characterized  by a balanced  budget,  G =  T, and  that 
taxes remain  unchanged.22  Hence any government  spending  increase  (or 
decrease)  dG precisely  equals  the combination  dM +  dB that  finances  it. 
A further  simplifying  assumption,  again in the one-period  static equi- 
librium  context,  is that K is fixed, so that dW also equals  dM +  dB. In 
20. The analysis in this article implicitly assumes that the public regards all the 
increase in the stock of outstanding  government  bonds as a net increase in wealth, 
because 14 omits "human  wealth,"  which would fall with anticipations  of additional 
taxes for debt service. By contrast, Barro has argued that human wealth would fall 
enough to leave total wealth unchanged; see Robert 3. Barro, "Are Government 
Bonds Net Wealth?"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 82 (November-December 
1974), pp. 1095-1117. The standard  arguments  against this view appeal to the im- 
perfections in the credit market faced by nearly all taxpayers, as well as by inter- 
generational  nonneutralities.  Rewriting 14 so that movements in human wealth offset 
some fraction of changes in the stock of bonds would alter none of my substantive 
conclusions. Moreover, by providing empirical evidence that the pricing of market- 
able assets is independent  of returns  to human (nonmarketable) wealth, Fama and 
Schwert suggest that the asset-market  effects, which are at the heart of the analysis 
here, would remain unaltered  even if movements in human wealth offset all changes 
in the stock of bonds; see Eugene F. Fama and G. William Schwert, "Human  Capi- 
tal and Capital Market Equilibrium,"  Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 4 (Jan- 
uary 1977), pp. 95-125.  Yet a further generalization  would be to allow for bond 
valuation changes by writing  B as a function of the yield on bonds. 
21.  See Carl F. Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a Government 
Budget Constraint,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 76 (January-February  1968), 
pp. 53-67; and William L. Silber, "Fiscal Policy in IS-LM Analysis: A Correction," 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 2 (November 1970), pp. 461-72. In a 
dynamic context, it is necessary to be precise about the passage of time, as well as 
about problems of  stability associated with interest payments on the government 
debt; see, for example, Blinder and Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?"  As written, 
15 strictly applies only to a single time period, where the time unit is identical to 
that used to define the model's flow variables (Y, G, and so on). 
22.  Making taxes depend on income would only complicate the algebra without 
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other  words, the investment  component  of income does not increase  the 
capital  stock  within  the period  under  analysis.28 
Behavior  in the asset  markets,  which  remains  to be represented,  is the 
heart  of the matter.  In general  the public  holds all three  assets (M, B, K) 
in its portfolio,  so that in principle  it is necessary  to specify  three  distinct 
asset demands.  However,  because  of the balance-sheet  constraint  empha- 
sized  by Brainard  and  Tobin24- that  is, as a consequence  of 14  any  one 
asset demand is a linear combination  of the other two and (predeter- 
mined) wealth. Hence there are only two independent  asset demands, 
and which two are specified  is irrelevant.  Even so, the need to specify 
explicitly  the portfolio behavior  describing  the demands  for two assets 
serves as a useful reminder  of the multiplicity  of asset markets  and the 
important  interrelations  among  them.  By contrast,  the standard  Keynes- 
ian model has only two kinds of assets (money and the collectivity  of 
nonmoney  claims, usually called "capital"),  so that, after applying  the 
balance-sheet  constraint,  it is necessary  to specify only one asset de- 
mand-usually  the demand for money. While the resulting  model is 
therefore  equivalent  to one specifying  instead  the demand  for nonmoney 
claims, the convention  of specifying  the demand  for money alone has 
often spawned  confusion.25 
A large  literature  has investigated  the properties  of asset  demand  sys- 
tems derived  from various  sets of assumptions  about  portfolio  investors' 
objectives  and their assessments  of the risks  and rewards  associated  with 
23.  Because the capital stock is fixed for the period of this analysis, an appealing 
generalization  would be to follow Tobin by letting the real price of capital q vary; 
see James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium  Approach to Monetary  Theory,"  Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 1 (February 1969), pp. 15-29. Replacing  K in 
14 by qK and adding an equation relating q inversely to the yield on capital, how- 
ever, would change none of the substantive  conclusions derived here. An alternative 
approach would be to rely on  a long-run steady-state growth model as in James 
Tobin, "Money and Economic Growth,"  Econometrica,  vol. 33 (October 1965), pp. 
671-84; in Blinder and Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?";  or in Martin  Feldstein, 
"Fiscal Policies, Inflation and Capital Formation," working paper 275  (National 
Bureau  of Economic Research,  August 1978). 
24.  William C. Brainard and James Tobin, "Pitfalls in Financial Model Build- 
ing," American Economic Review, vol. 57 (May 1968), pp. 99-122. 
25.  For example, the Keynesian speculative demand for money, which depends 
fundamentally on interest-rate  expectations, is simply the negative of  the demand 
for assets subject to capital gains and losses. In the absence of any appeal to expec- 
tations, the observed negative interest  elasticity of money demand is evidence for the 
inventory-theoretic  interest sensitivity of  transactions demand and (contrary to a 
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holding  each specific  asset. The common  presumption  underlying  nearly 
all these treatments  is that  investors  are  risk averse,  and that at most one 
asset bears  a certain  return.  For the analysis  here, it is useful to think  of 
the return  to holding  money as fixed (for convenience,  at zero) and the 
respective  returns  to holding  both bonds and capital  as uncertain.  Espe- 
cially in the literature  of monetary  economics,  it is customary  to express 
asset demands  as both linear  in expected  returns  and first-degree  homo- 
geneous  in wealth,  so that the proportional  allocation  of the portfolio  is 
invariant  to wealth.26  For the  purposes  of this  analysis,  however,  it is more 
straightforward  to preserve  the linearity  of the model, including  the pre- 
sumed  nonnegative  dependence  of each asset demand  on total wealth. 
A fully specified  system  of linear  asset  demands  for the money-bonds- 
capital  model is 
-MD-  [mol  Fmi  m2  m31  [rM  1  m4l  Fm&1 
(16)  BD  =  bo  +  b1  b2  b3  rB  +  b4  Y +  b5  W, 
LKDJ  LkoJ  Lk,  k2  k3j  LrKJ  Lk4J  Lk 
where 
MD, BD, KD =  the amount  of each asset  demanded 
mi, bi, ki =  fixed coefficients 
rm  =  the known  yield on money 
rB, rK  =  the respective  expected  yields  on bonds  and capital. 
From  the implications  of the balance-sheet  constraint, 
(17)mi  +  b, +  k=O,  i=O,..  , 4 
m6 +  b6 +  k5 =  1, 
it is possible  to specify  the entire  asset-demand  system  in terms  of only 
two fixed coefficients  in each column vector. Moreover,  if the square 
26.  Friedman and de Leeuw in particular  provided the rationale for the wealth 
homogeneity constraint. See Milton Friedman, "The Quantity Theory of Money- 
A Restatement,"  in Milton Friedman,  ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money 
(University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 3-21; and Frank de Leeuw, "A Model of 
Financial Behavior," in  James S.  Duesenberry and others, eds.,  The Brookings 
Quarterly  Econometric  Model of the United States (Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 465- 
530. In "The Effect of Shifting Wealth Ownership  on the Term Structure  of Interest 
Rates,"  working paper 239, rev. (National Bureau  of Economic Research,  February 
1978),  I  have shown that constant relative risk aversion and joint normally dis- 
tributed asset-return  assessments are sufficient to generate asset-demand  functions 
that are homogeneous in wealth and linear in expected returns, either exactly in a 
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matrix indicating  the relative asset substitutabilities  is symmetric,  the 
further  constraints, 
(18)  bl= m2,  k1=  m3,  k2=  b3, 
also apply.27  From 17 and 18, it is then possible to specify this matrix 
completely  by specifying  only three  coefficients. 
Applying  the balance-sheet  and symmetry  constraints  in the way that 
will prove  most convenient  (because  it is analytically  irrelevant  which  co- 
efficients  they eliminate) renders  the asset-demand.system  16 as 
(19) 
-MD  MO  1  -m2  -M8  M2  M  l  rM 
BD  bo  +  m2  -M2  -  bs  b3  rB 
_KD_  -mO-bo  L  m8  b  -m  -  b3_  rK 
[  m4  1  m[ 
+  b4  y+  b5b  W 
L-M4  -b4_  L  _-  m5-  b5_ 
Within the matrix, the purpose  underlying  the arbitrary  selection is to 
retain  explicitly  the three off-diagonal  coefficients  indicating  the relative 
asset substitutabilities.  On the common  assumption  that the three assets 
are gross substitutes,  these three  coefficients  are each negative,  and from 
17 the on-diagonal  own-yield  coefficients  are then  positive  as expected.28 
To complete  the specification  of behavior  in the asset  markets,  it is neces- 
sary  only to add  the market-clearing  equilibrium  condition  extending  5 as 
MD 
(20)  BD  B 
27.  Despite the frequent  immediate  resort to symmetry  constraints  by researchers 
who apparently assume that the properties  of consumer demand theory necessarily 
carry over to portfolio theory, symmetry in derived asset-demand  systems implies 
strong restrictions  on the underlying  utility function. For a careful treatment  of this 
question, see V. Vance Roley, "A Structural  Model of the U.S. Government  Securi- 
ties Market" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard University, 1977). 
28.  The elements of this matrix are functions of the variance-covariance  matrix 
of the asset-return  assessments. Blanchard and Plantes have shown that gross sub- 
stitution requires a positive covariance between each pair of uncertain returns;  see 
Olivier J. Blanchard and Mary Kay Plantes, "A Note on Gross Substitutability  of 
Financial Assets," Econometrica,  vol. 45 (April 1977), pp. 769-71. 614  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
Because  the model  now includes  two asset  yields,  rather  than  only one 
as in the simpler  model employed  in the previous  section,  it is also neces- 
sary  to be more  specific  about  "the  interest  rate"  in the IS curve.  The role 
of the yield variable  in 13, which  follows  from  the underlying  investment 
function  2, is to represent  the effect  of the expected  return  that  is required 
to induce spending  for plants, equipment,  houses, or other long-lived 
physical  assets;  and the negative  sign of this effect  follows from the pre- 
sumption  that, the lower  is this required  return,  the more  physical  assets 
are able to provide  it. Hence  it is clear  that  the interest  rate  in the  IS curve 
is rK,  the  expected  yield  on real  capital.29 
When  G, T, M, K, r,,  and the initial  stock of bonds  B0 are treated  as 
exogenous,  the eight-equation  model consisting  of 13, 14, 15, any two 
components  of 19, and all three components  of 20 suffice  to determine 
Y, W, B, rB,  r,,, MD, BD, and KD. It is more useful, however, to solve the 
model in a three-equation form determining Y, r3, and rK, analogous to 
the two-equation  IS-LM model. With r,  fixed at zero for convenience, 
the model is 
(21)  Y=yo+y,G+(l  -yl)T+y2rK+  ya(M +  K+  B) 
(22)  M=  mO+m2rB+  msrK+  m4Y+  mB(M+  K+  B) 
(23)  B =  bo-(m2+  b8)rB+  b3rK+  b4Y+  bS(M+  K+  B). 
The diagram  below plots 21 and 22 in (rK, Y) space as conditional  IS 
and LM curves,  making  explicit that the IS curve is conditional  on the 
values of G, M, K, B, and T, while the LM curve  is conditional  on the 
values of M, K, B, and rB.30  The dependence  of the positions of both 
curves  on the quantities  of the three assets that are given in a balanced 
budget  situation  is straightforward,  but the dependence  of the LM curve 
on rB  is more interesting.  If the model is normalized  to solve 21 and 22 
for Y and  rK,  as implied  in the diagram,  then  23 determines  r8-which in 
turn affects  the positions  and hence the intersection  of 21 and 22 in the 
29.  Rather than relate Y negatively to rK,  13 could relate Y positively to q (with 
q related inversely to rK); see note 23. Alternatively, in a more complicated model 
including both government  bonds and private bonds, 13 could relate Y negatively to 
a composite "cost of capital" consisting of a weighted combination of r  and the 
interest  rate on private  borrowing. 
30. Allowing for the dependence  of B on rB would further complicate the sense 
in which the LM  curve is conditional  on rB,  and would also render  the IS curve con- 
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(rK, Y)  space. But both rK and Y are also arguments of 23. Hence rK, Y, 
and r8 are  jointly  determined  in a fully simultaneous  way, and any repre- 
sentation  in only two dimensions  is misleading  without  attention  to the 
omitted  codetermined  variable. 
It is now possible  to reexamine  the consequences  of fiscal  policy,  using 
the condensed  model of 21 through  23 together  with a statement  of how 
any associated  deficit is financed.  The partial-equilibrium  in the goods 
market  differs  only slightly  from  that in the model without  wealth  effects 
reviewed  in the previous  section.  From 21 and the government  financing 
constraint,  dG =  dB +  dM, the effect of raising  government  spending 
above  the balanced  budget  level is simply 
(24)  GY_- Yi +  3. 
The y1  is identical  to 1/(1  -  cl) in 8, and thus the goods-market  wealth 
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policy. (Hence  the rightward  shift  from  IS0,  conditional  on G0,  to IS1,  con- 
ditional  on G1 >  G0,  as shown  in the diagram  on page 619, exceeds  the 
analogous  rightward  IS shift  in the first  diagram  of this article.) 
The asset-market  equations  22 and 23 reflect  two effects of deficits. 
Transactions  crowding out is familiar from the previous section and 
should  require  little further  discussion.  Given  m, > 0, the additional  in- 
come from  the goods-market  effect  increases  the transactions  demand  for 
money.  If M remains  unchanged,  either  or both  rB  and  rK  must  rise (recall 
that  m2, mi3 < 0)  to clear  the money  market.  If both  M and  B were  to re- 
main fixed, in violation of the government  financing  constraint,  solving 
the model shows that rB  and rK  would both rise. Given y2 < 0,  the in- 
crease in rK  would in turn offset some part of the income effect in the 
goods market.  As long as the assets are all gross substitutes,  the multi- 
asset model leaves unchanged  the conclusion  that transactions  crowding 
out is unambiguously  in the "out"  direction. 
What  about  portfolio  crowding  out?  Under  bond financing  of the defi- 
cit, M again  remains  unchanged  but total  wealth,  M + B + K, increases. 
Given  m5 > 0, an assumption  examined  empirically  below, in the money 
market  the wealth  effect  reinforces  the transactions  effect,  making  a larger 
net excess  demand  for money.  Hence an even  greater  rise  in either  or both 
rB  and rK  is necessary  to clear  the money  market. 
In the presence  of wealth  effects,  however,  it is no longer  so simple  to 
determine  whether  what  clears  the money  market  is a rise in both rB  and 
rK  or in only one of them. The entire  increase  in wealth resulting  from 
financing  the deficit consists of an increase  in the outstanding  stock of 
bonds.  However,  given 0 < b5 <  1-that  is, assuming  that  people  do not 
want  to hold all their  increased  wealth  in the form  of increased  bonds-a 
net excess  supply  of bonds  emerges  in the absence  of yield  changes.  More- 
over, just as the balance-sheet  constraint  implies  b5 <  1 if m5 >  0, it is 
plausible  to assume  that the counterpart  to m4 >  0 is b4 < 0, so that the 
transactions  effect makes this net excess supply of bonds even greater. 
Since the demand  for bonds depends  positively  on r. and negatively  on 
rK, the yield movements  that eliminate  this net excess supply must be 
either  an increase  in rB  (which  also helps  eliminate  the net excess  demand 
for money), or a decrease  in rw  (which  compounds  the net excess  demand 
for money), or both. 
Because  of the linear  dependence  of the three  asset-demand  equations, 
examining  the capital  market  per se can provide  no further  information, Benjamin  M.  Friedman  617 
but it does serve as a useful aid to intuition. Given k, =  1 -  m, -  b5  > 0, 
the increase in total wealth raises the demand for capital, but in the short 
run K remains unchanged. On the assumption that k, < 0,  however, the 
transactions effect reduces the demand for capital. If the portfolio effect 
outweighs  the  transactions effect,3' the  yield  movements  necessary  to 
eliminate the net excess demand for capital must again be either an in- 
crease in rB, a decrease in rK, or both. 
Because an increase in r. not only helps eliminate net excess demand in 
the money market (and the capital market) but also helps reduce net ex- 
cess supply in the bond market, rE unambiguously rises as the result of 
bond-financed government deficit spending. By contrast, while an increase 
in rK, which would reduce real investment, helps clear the money market, 
a decrease in rK,  which would stimulate real investment, helps clear the 
bond market (and the capital market).  Hence it is impossible to tell a 
priori whether rK  rises or falls. Because the effect of interest rates in the 
goods market depends on rK, it is impossible to tell a priori whether the 
portfolio effect (or the sum of the portfolio effect plus the transactions 
effect)  will offset  or reinforce  the income  effect  of fiscal  policy. 
Solving  22  and 23  for  the  partial-equilibrium "asset-markets-only" 
effect of dB =  dG, with Y fixed, indicates whether the portfolio effect per 
se is one  of  crowding out or crowding in. The relevant partial deriva- 
tives-solved  from 22 and 23, and hence partial only because they do not 
allow for 21 -are 
(25)  drB  _  b3ms  +  mg(1 
-  b6) 
aG  ~~A 
2OrK  mnl(-b5)-m2m5-bsn5 
(26)  aG  A 
where the determinant A is the sum of cross-products of the three key 
substitution coefficients, 
(27)  A  =  m2m3 +  m2b3  +  m3b3. 
If all three assets are substitutes (m2, mi,, b,  <  0),  A is strictly positive. 
Consequently, as long as people do not want to hold all the new wealth 
in bonds (b,  <  1),  equation 25 confirms that rB  unambiguously rises with 
31. The portfolio effect is the more likely to outweigh the transactions  effect as 
more than the single time period elapses because the stock of bonds continues to 
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a bond-financed  increase  in G. By contrast,  as long as people  also want  to 
hold at least some of the new wealth  in money (mi5  > 0), the numerator 
of 26 consists  of one negative  term minus  two other negative  terms,  so 
that  whether  rj rises  or falls with a bond-financed  increase  in G-that  is, 
whether  the portfolio effect constitutes  crowding  out or crowding  in- 
depends on the magnitudes  of the two key substitution  coefficients  m2 
and b. 
Hence the question  of whether  the portfolio effect of bond-financed 
deficit spending  crowds  out or crowds  in private  investment  reduces  to 
the long-debated  issue of whether  bonds are closer portfolio  substitutes 
for money or for capital.32  Given the symmetry  assumption  of 18, it is 
convenient  to summarize  the relevant  asset substitutability  properties  in 
terms  of a relative  substitutability  index  defined  as 
(28)  bs ( 
This  index  is the ratio  of the substitutability  of bonds  for money (and vice 
versa) to the substitutability  of bonds  for capital  (and vice versa). Given 
M2,  b3 < 0, a is strictly  positive.  If bonds  are close substitutes  for money 
but  not for capital,  m2is large  and  b3  small,  so that  of  is large.  If bonds  are 
close substitutes  for capital  but not for money,  M2  is small  and  b, large,  so 
that a is small. In principle the index a can describe any position on the 
relative  substitutability  scale  between  a = 0 (bonds  and  capital  are  perfect 
substitutes)  and a =  co (bonds  and  money  are  perfect  substitutes). 
From 26, then, the sign of the portfolio  effect  of bond-financed  deficit 
spending  hinges  on the relative  substitutability  condition 
(29)  drK  O  as  aG~~a 
where  the critical  value  a*  is  simply38 
(30)  -  ma  (=  m5)  1 - br,- m5 
32.  See,  for  example, Tobin, "Money, Capital, and Other Stores of  Value"; 
Tobin',  "An Essay on Principles of Debt Management";  Tobin, "A General Equi- 
librium Approach";  and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "Money, Debt, and 
Economic Activity," Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  80  (September-October 
1972), pp. 951-77. 
33.  It is interesting to note that this result is independent of  m3 ( = kl),  the 
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Hence there  is portfolio  crowding  out when  the value of the relative  sub- 
stitutability  index-that  is, the interest  rate coefficient  ratio-is  smaller 
than the corresponding  wealth  coefficient  ratio,  but portfolio  crowding  in 
when  the index  is greater  than  the wealth  coefficient  ratio. 
The diagram  below summarizes  this analysis  graphically  by plotting  in 
(rK, Y) space several conditional  LM curves representing  the money 
market  equilibrium  of 22. First, LMo  indicates  the locus of (rK,  Y) pairs 
that will clear  the money  market  given  the values  of the initial  balanced- 
budget  equilibrium  with Mo, Ko,  Bo, rB,. Because  the bond financing  of 
deficit  spending  changes  B according  to dB =  dG,  as well  as rB  according  to 
22, the LM curve  in general  shifts as a consequence  of the fiscal policy 
action,  with a new  locus  LM, associated  with  B1  and rB,.  The increase  in B 
tends  to shift  LM1  leftward  (that  is, to raise  the market-clearing  value  of rK 
rK  WLMI(a,  <  a,*) 
/  z  ~LMo(  * 
I  I  I  -  Y 
YO  NO  Yl(  a*) YI(Ca  >  a'*) 
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for given Y),  while  the rise  in rB  tends  to shift  LM1  rightward.  Which  effect 
predominates  depends  on the relative  substitutability  condition  of 29. 
If a =  a*, the two components of the portfolio effect exactly offset one 
another,  so that the conditional  LM curve shifts neither  rightward  nor 
leftward,  and the rightward  shift  of the conditional  IS curve (from  IS, to 
IS1), together  with traditional  Hicks' transactions  crowding  out, is the 
entire  story  of bond-financed  deficits. 
If a < a*-that  is, if bonds are  more  substitutable  for capital  and  less 
substitutable  for money than a*-the  conditional  LM curve shifts left- 
ward,  and  portfolio  crowding  out joins  transactions  crowding  out. In con- 
trast  to transactions  crowding  out, however,  which  can offset  only a part 
of the income effect  of fiscal  policy, portfolio  crowding  out can result  in 
Y1 <  Y0 if the conditional  LM curve shifts leftward  far enough. (The 
diagram  shows  the Y1  value  conditional  on a < a* as greater  than  YO,  but 
the opposite  could  also be true  a priori.) 
Finally, if a >  a*, the conditional  LM curve shifts rightward,  and 
portfolio  crowding  in reinforces  the income  effect  of fiscal  policy. In this 
case the resulting  Y1 is not merely  greater  than YO  but greater  than the 
value of Y1 for a =  a* corresponding to the traditional IS-LM analysis 
with transactions crowding out only. 
SOME  SPECIAL  CASES 
Because  the previous  literature  on portfolio  crowding  out has typically 
derived  rather  different  results  from  those  presented  above,  it is important 
to show how alternative  results  emerge  as special  cases  within  the model 
developed  here. Two principal  issues pertain  to the wealth coefficients 
and the interest  rate coefficients  of the asset-demand  equations  of 16. In 
both cases the relative  substitutability  condition  of 29 serves  as a useful 
tool of analysis. 
First, many economists  have argued  that the only motive for holding 
money  balances  is to facilitate  transactions,  so that the role of money as 
a store  of value  generates  no money  holding  for portfolio  purposes.  Ando 
and Shell have formalized  the argument  for excluding  wealth from the 
money  demand  function,  and Goldfeld  and others  have provided  empiri- 
cal evidence on this question.84 If money demand is independent  of 
34.  Albert Ando and Karl Shell, "Appendix: Demand for Money in a General 
Portfolio Model in the Presence of  an Asset that Dominates Money," in  Gary Benjamin  M. Friedman  621 
wealth,  then  portfolio  crowding  out cannot  occur,  and the only possibili- 
ties are portfolio  crowding  in or an unshifting  conditional  LM curve.  If 
m., =  0 (and 0 < b5,  k5,  <  1), the critical  value of the relative  substitut- 
ability  index  is a* = 0, and a < a*  is  impossible.  If bonds  are  even  slightly 
substitutable  for money (mi2  =  0), then  a > a*, and  there  is automatically 
portfolio  crowding  in. Alternatively,  if bonds and money are not substi- 
tutes (m2 =  0), then  =  0 also, and the conditional  LM curve  does not 
shift. 
Second, it is an unfortunate  legacy of Keynes'  General  Theory  that 
many economists  continue  to work with a two-asset  model in which all 
nonmoney claims are by assumption  perfect substitutes.  If bonds and 
capital are perfect  substitutes,  portfolio crowding  in cannot occur, and 
the only possibilities  are portfolio crowding  out or an unshifting  condi- 
tional LM curve. In the limit as b3 becomes large (in absolute  value), 
cf =  0 regardless  of mi2 (unless m2 is also infinite,  indicating  a one-asset 
model), and a >  a* is impossible.  If money demand  depends  on wealth 
(m5 #&  0), then  a < a*, and  there  is automatically  portfolio  crowding  out. 
Alternatively,  if m, = 0, then a* = 0 also, and  the conditional  LM  curve 
does not shift. 
The well-known  analysis  due to Blinder  and Solow is an example  of 
this second  special  case.85  By assuming  that  bonds and  capital  are  perfect 
substitutes  (cr =  0),  Blinder and Solow arbitrarily  preclude  portfolio 
crowding  in for the stable form of their model. Hence their analysis  of 
"bond  finance"-that is, issuing  government  bonds that are perfect  sub- 
stitutes  for capital-refers to one extreme  case. One also could describe 
"money  finance,"  for which the LM curve unquestionably  shifts right- 
ward,  as the polar case of issuing  government  bonds  that are  perfect  sub- 
stitutes  for money (that is, a =  oo  )-but  there  seems  little point  in doing 
so. Similarly,  it is misleading  to think of the opposite  polar case, which 
Blinder  and Solow call "bond  finance,"  as a general  description  of bond 
financing  of government  deficits. 
The potential validity of these special assumptions  about both the 
wealth  responses  and the interest  rate  responses  of the portfolio  demand 
system  is essentially  an empirical  issue, and thus it is appropriate  to ex- 
Fromm and Lawrence R. Klein, eds., The Brookings  Model: Perspective and Recent 
Developments (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975; distributor,  American Elsevier), 
pp. 560-63; Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited." 
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amine the available  evidence. In the following section I introduce  evi- 
dence on the wealth elasticity  of the demand  for money. Consideration 
of the asset  substitutability  question  follows  a further  generalization  of the 
model. 
MONEY  DEMAND  AND  WEALTH 
Whether  the demand  for money depends  on income, wealth,  or both 
is an old issue  in monetary  economics.  Fisher's  transactions  version  of the 
quantity  equation  emphasized  the role of money  as a means  of payment, 
while the Cambridge  cash-balance  version  due to Lavington  and Pigou 
relied  on money  as a store  of value.36  Keynes  accepted  both  in distinguish- 
ing the transactions  and speculative  components  of money demand.87 
Despite some allegiance  to the Fisherian  quantity  theory, monetarists 
have typically  followed  Milton  Friedman  in accepting  both rationales  for 
holding  money,  although  their  empirical  work  has  usually  favored  income 
over wealth.38  Although  the question  of whether  money  demand  depends 
on income  or wealth  is often stated  in terms  of money  as a means  of pay- 
ment versus  money as a store of value, in fact the issue is not nearly  so 
clear-cut.  For example,  even in the context  of a pure  transactions  model, 
money  demand  will still depend  on wealth  if wealth  levels affect  attitudes 
toward  convenience,  or if money  is used in financial  transactions. 
In his review  of the evidence  on the demand  for money  five  years  ago, 
Goldfeld explicitly  compared  the results of using income and of using 
wealth (defined as total household net worth) in the money-demand 
function.  In brief, using data for 1952:2 through  1972:4, he found that 
the wealth elasticity  differed  significantly  from zero only when income 
was excluded  from the equation,  while the income  elasticity  differed  sig- 
nificantly  from zero regardless  of whether  wealth was included or ex- 
36.  Irving Fisher, The Purchasing  Power of Money: Its Determination  and Rela- 
tion to Credit, Interest and Crises (Macmillan, 1911); F. Lavington, The English 
Capital Market (London: Methuen, 1921); Pigou, "The  Value of Money."  Marshall 
had also acknowledged the dependence of money demand on wealth; see Alfred 
Marshall,  Money, Credit and Commerce (London: Macmillan, 1923). 
37. Keynes, General Theory. 
38.  Milton Friedman, "The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empiri- 
cal Results,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 67 (August 1959), pp. 327-51. An 
important exception is Meltzer's work; see, for example, Allan H.  Meltzer, "The 
Demand for  Money: The  Evidence from the Time Series," Journal of  Political 
Economy, vol. 71 (June 1963), pp. 219-46. Benjamin  M. Friedman  623 
cluded."9  In his subsequent  investigation  into the "mystery  of the missing 
money"40-that is, the consistent  large overprediction  for the money- 
demand  equation  after 1973-he  used 1952:2 to 1973:4 data  and found 
that,  with  both  income  and  wealth  included  in the equation,  the t-statistics 
for the respective  elasticities  were 3.0 and 2.3. Extrapolation  exercises, 
however,  showed that including  wealth  did not clear up the overpredic- 
tion mystery.  According  to Goldfeld's  evidence,  therefore,  there  is little 
basis  for rejecting  the special  case of Ando and  Shell  in which,  because  of 
a zero wealth  elasticity  of money  demand,  crowding  out cannot  occur. 
Table 4 presents  the results  of estimating  a money-demand  function 
comparable  to that  of Goldfeld;  it includes  income  and  wealth  alternately 
and then  includes  both, using  first  Goldfeld's  original  sample (1952:2 to 
1972:4)  and then a sample for 1952:2 to 1977:4.41 The table reports 
results  for equations  based on a real adjustment  and then a nominal  ad- 
justment,  as in Goldfeld's  earlier  and  later  work,  respectively. 
The results  shown  in the table for 1952:2 to 1972:4 essentially  repli- 
cate Goldfeld's  earlier  findings.  Under either  the real or the nominal  ad- 
justment,  the standard  error  is minimized  in the equation  that includes 
income but not wealth. Adding wealth neither raises nor lowers the 
standard  error.  The wealth elasticity  differs  significantly  from zero only 
if income  is excluded.  In equation  2 with a real adjustment  that  includes 
wealth but not income, the implied speed of adjustment  is implausibly 
slow. In equation  5, with a nominal  adjustment  that includes  wealth  but 
not income,  the implied  speed  of adjustment  is negative. 
The next results, for 1952:2 through 1977:4, differ sharply from 
those for 1952:2 to 1972:4 in several  ways. With both the real and the 
nominal  adjustment,  the standard  error  is minimized  in the equation  in- 
cluding  both income  and wealth,  and the elasticities  with respect  to both 
variables  differ  significantly  from zero. The equations  with the nominal 
adjustment  fit the data uniformly  better, but always at the expense of 
39.  Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited." Goldfeld did find a signifi- 
cant elasticity with respect to the change in wealth, but it is difficult  to interpret  this 
result, and he did not emphasize  it. 
40.  Goldfeld, "Missing  Money." 
41.  In the results shown in the table, the wealth variable is household financial 
asset holdings. The results do not change much if any of three other definitions of 
wealth is used instead: household financial net worth, household total asset hold- 
ings, or household total net worth; these alternate results are available from the 
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Table  5. F-Statistlcs  for  Stability  Tests  of Money-Demand  Equations 
Equation  Variable  Adjustment  F-statistic 
1  Income  Real  6.25 
(6,91) 
4  Income  Nominal  6.14 
(6, 91) 
2  Wealth  Real  1.68 
(6,91) 
5  Wealth  Nominal  1.89 
(6, 91) 
3  Income  Real  4.82 
Wealth  (7, 89) 
6  Income  Nominal  3.69 
Wealth  (7, 89) 
Source: Derived from corresponding  equations in table 4. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  indicate the degrees of freedom. The critical values of F for (6, 91) are: 
95-percent level, 2.20; 99-percent level, 3.02. The critical values of F for (7, 89) are: 95-percent level, 2.11; 
99-percent level, 2.85. 
negative or implausibly  slow adjustment  speeds. The rapid adjustment 
and large  p value  of the original  Goldfeld  equation  for 1952:4 to 1977:4 
(see 1'), indicates  a further  severe  problem. 
The results  for 1952:2 through  1977:4, suggesting  the dependence  of 
money demand  on wealth, therefore  call into question  the most familiar 
argument  against  the possibility  of portfolio crowding  out. Because the 
contrast  between  these results  and those for the earlier  sample  suggests 
some change  in the underlying  behavior,  however,  it is interesting  to test 
for the presence  of a structural  shift at the end of 1972. The F-statistics 
presented  in table  5 for Chow  tests  of the hypothesis  of no structural  shift 
provide  some further  support  for the dependence  of money demand  on 
wealth,  although  the full set of results  is somewhat  puzzling.  Under  both 
the real and  nominal  adjustment  the results  warrant  rejecting  with  99 per- 
cent confidence  the stability  of the equation  relating  money demand  to 
income;  but they do not warrant  rejecting  the stability  of the equation 
relating  money demand  to wealth,  even at the weaker  95 percent  confi- 
dence level. What  is perplexing,  however,  is that  under  both the real and 
nominal  adjustment  the results  warrant  rejecting  with 99 percent  confi- 
dence  the stability  of the equation  relating  money  demand  to both  income 
and wealth. The question here is whether  to include wealth, and not Benjamin  M. Friedman  627 
whether  to exclude  income.  Hence  the contrast  between  these  results  must 
remain  a topic  for further  research.42 
These limited  empirical  results  are far from  conclusive,  and  investigat- 
ing the money-demand  function  per se is not the objective  of this article. 
Nevertheless,  the results  shown  in tables  4 and 5 provide  little empirical 
support  for the assumption  of zero wealth  elasticity  that would preclude 
portfolio  crowding  out. 
A  DIGRESSION  ON  THE  MYSTERY  OF  THE 
MISSING  MONEY 
Equations  relating  money  demand  to income  show a significant  break 
after  1972, while  those  related  to wealth  do not. This  finding  suggests  that 
the difference  between  the two specifications  may have something  to do 
with the post-1972 overprediction  mystery,  an episode  that has attracted 
much  attention  because  of its critical  implications  for monetary  policy. It 
is worthwhile  to examine whether  the distinction  between income and 
wealth  does in fact provide  any light here. 
Table 6 summarizes  the results  of simulating,  over 1973:1 to 1977:4, 
various  money-demand  functions  estimated  for the sample  from 1952:2 
to 1972:4. In each case the simulation  is dynamic-after  1973:1, the 
internally  generated  value  is used for the lagged  money  stock. 
The first six simulated  equations  are those also considered  in table 5 
and  shown  in full in table  4. The equations  relating  money  demand  either 
to income alone or to both income and wealth show the familiar  large 
overprediction  that  continues  to worsen  throughout  the  simulation  period. 
The equation  relating  money  demand  to wealth  alone under  the real ad- 
justment (2)  also overpredicts,  but with far smaller  errors  that do not 
tend to increase  toward  the end of the simulation  period.  However,  equa- 
tion 5, relating  money demand  to wealth  under  the nominal  adjustment, 
consistently  underpredicts  throughout  the simulation  period (because  of 
the negative  estimated  adjustment  speed  as shown  in table  4) and  has the 
largest  absolute  mean  and  root-mean-square  errors  of the six. Hence  relat- 
42.  Two recent papers have usefully set forth the case for a shift in the relation- 
ship between money demand and income because of changes in banking  technology. 
See Gillian Garcia and Simon Pak, "Some Clues in the Case of the Missing Money" 
(University of California at Berkeley, Department of Economics, February 1978); 
and Richard  D. Porter  and Eileen Mauskopf,  "Cash  Management  and  the Recent  Shift 
in the Demand for Demand Deposits" (Federal Reserve Board,  November 1978). 628  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
Table  6. Dynamic  Simulation  Results  for  Money-Demand  Eqations,  1952:2-1972:4 
Sample  Period 
Billions  of dollars 
1973:1-1977:4 errors 
Root-mean- 
Equation  Variable  Adjustment Mean  square  1977:4 error 
1  Income  Real  21.4  26.5  46.2 
4  Income  Nominal  18.8  25.4  48.0 
2  Wealth  Real  4.5  5.6  5.0 
5  Wealth  Nominal  -22.9  27.8  -52.3 
3  Income  Real  19.2  24.2  42.3 
Wealth 
6  Income  Nominal  14.9  21.3  41.2 
Wealth 
Hamburger's  equation  ...  ...  8.0  9.6  16.1 
Hamburger's  equation 
with wealth  ...  ...  -0.4  1.9  -0.8 
Sources: Derived from corresponding  equations in table 4, from the money-demand equation in Ham- 
burger, "Behavior of  the Money Stock." and from a variant of  the Hamburger  equation discussed in the 
text. 
a.  The money-stock variable for  the first six equations is based on  Goldfeld's three-month average 
centered on the middle of the quarter; in the last two equations, this variable is based on Hamburger's 
two-month average centered on the end of the quarter. 
ing money  demand  only to wealth  does achieve  a marked  improvement, 
but  this  is restricted  to the  real  adjustment. 
This discussion  of the mystery  of the missing  money  also requires  con- 
sideration  of Hamburger's  proposed  solution.43  His money-demand  equa- 
tion, estimated  for 1955:2 to 1972:4, demonstrably  outperforms  equa- 
tions like Goldfeld's  in post-1972 simulations.  For purposes  of the cur- 
rent  discussion,  the most  interesting  property  of the Hamburger  equation 
is its inclusion  of the dividend-price  ratio  of common  stocks,  intended  to 
capture  the elasticity  of substitution  between  money  and  equity  securities. 
The estimated  elasticity  is significantly  less than  zero (t-statistic,  -2.5). 
It is also possible  to give an entirely  different  interpretation  to the role 
played by the dividend-price ratio in Hamburger's money-demand equa- 
tion. Because  common  stock dividends  are a fairly  stable  trendlike  series 
over  time,  most  variation  of the dividend-price  ratio  stems  from  the varia- 
tion in stock prices. Moreover,  the variation  of stock prices  in turn ac- 
counts for most of the measured  variation  of household  wealth  because 
43.  Hamburger,  "Behavior  of the Money Stock." Benjamin  M. Friedman  629 
equities  are both the largest  and the most volatilely  valued  component  of 
household  assets. To the extent that dividends  rise roughly  like a price 
index over time, therefore,  the time-series  behavior  of the dividend-price 
ratio serves  as a close proxy  for the time-series  behavior  of (the recipro- 
cal of)  the real value of household wealth. In addition,  Hamburger's 
equation  includes  no explicit  wealth  variable,  despite  his strong  appeal  to 
the generalized  portfolio concept that money is a substitute  for a broad 
range  of assets. 
What  happens  if household  wealth  replaces  the dividend-price  ratio  in 
Hamburger's  money-demand  equation?  The answer  is that the estimated 
results  differ  negligibly  but  that,  as the equations  reported  in table  6 show, 
the wealth form of the equation  substantially  outperforms  Hamburger's 
own dividend-price  form in post-1972 simulations.  In fact, the Ham- 
burger  equation  with  wealth  substituted  for the dividend-price  ratio  tracks 
the postsample  data astonishingly  well, with only a slight tendency  to 
underpredict  on average.  A  plausible conclusion is that Hamburger's 
proposed solution for the mystery of the missing money is simply a 
disguised  story about  the role of wealth  in the money-demand  function, 
and  that  the solution  works  better  without  the  disguise. 
SUMMARY 
Several  theoretical  and  empirical  conclusions  emerge  from  the investi- 
gation  of portfolio  crowding  out and  crowding  in. 
In a general  model including  money, bonds, and capital,  there is no 
justification  for presuming  a priori  whether  the portfolio  effect  associated 
with bond-financed  government  deficits  offsets  or reinforces  the familiar 
income  effect  of fiscal  policy. 
Whether  this  portfolio  effect  is positive  or negative  depends  on a crucial 
but simple  relative  substitutability  condition:  portfolio  crowding  out (or 
/crowding  in) results  when  the ratio  of the substitution  coefficient  between 
bonds and money  to the substitution  coefficient  between  bonds and capi- 
tal is smalier  (greater) than  the ratio  of the respective  wealth  coefficients 
of the demands  for money and capital. If the two ratios are precisely 
equal, there is no portfolio effect, and the traditional  IS-LM analysis  is 
adequate  to describe  bond-financed  government  deficits. 
If portfolio  crowding  out does occur, in general  it can (unlike trans- 
actions  crowding  out) offset  more than all of the standard  income effect 
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Special cases occur in the general  model: if the wealth elasticity  of 
money demand  is zero, portfolio crowding  out cannot occur. If bonds 
and  capital  are  perfect  substitutes,  portfolio  crowding  in cannot  occur. 
The most recent empirical  evidence  does not support  the contention 
that the wealth elasticity  of money demand  is zero. Instead,  the role of 
wealth in the money-demand  function provides potential clues to the 
troublesome  post-1972 overprediction  problem  of conventional  money- 
demand  equations. 
Portfolio  Substitutabilities  and  the Role of Debt Management  Policy 
The question  of what  forms  of holding  wealth  are  close or distant  sub- 
stitutes  for others has long intrigued  monetary  economists.  As the pre- 
vious section  has shown,  this issue  lies at the core of the analysis  of fiscal 
policy involving  bond-financed  deficits. 
Two distinct approaches  facilitate analyzing  the substitutability  for 
other  assets  of government  nonmoney  debt  claims.  The positive  approach 
is to accept  as given the terms  of these claims  and then to investigate  the 
properties  of the public's  demands  for them, bringing  to bear whatever 
empircal evidence  is available.  Alternatively,  because  the government  is 
free to set the terms  on such claims,  just as the public  is free to decide  at 
what  price (or whether  at all) it will accept  them,  the normative  approach 
is to treat  the intended  economic  effect  as given  and  to ask  what  terms  on 
govemment  debt claims  will best achieve  it. Pursuing  the normative  ap- 
proach  leads directly  to the consideration  of debt-management  policy, a 
topic that economists  have allowed  to lie fallow for more  than a decade. 
COMPOSITION  OF  THE  FEDERAL  DEBT 
To begin,  it is useful to take note of the basic features  of government 
debt securities. Two characteristics  seem especially important  to the 
question, which was crucial in the analysis  of the previous  section of 
whether  government  bonds  are  closer  substitutes  for money  or for bonds. 
First,  both Tobin and  prominent  monetarists  have emphasized  the dis- 
tinction between  nominal and real claims." In the United States, as in 
most other  industrialized  countries,  interest-bearing  government  debt in- 
struments  have nominal  principal  amounts  and (except for discounted 
44.  See in particular  Tobin, "Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value," and 
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Table  7. Matuity  Distribution  of Oustanding  U.S. Government  Secridties, 
End  of Year,  1977 
Maturity  class  Amount 
(years)  (billions  of dollars) Percent  of total 
Lessthan1  233.0  50.7 
1-5  151.3  32.9 
5-10  45.9  10.0 
10-15  8.8  1.9 
15-20  10.9  2.4 
20 and  over  10.0  2.2 
Total  459.9  100.0 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Figures are rounded. 
bills) nominal  coupons.  Tobin has argued,  largely  on these grounds  to- 
gether with an assumption  about the inflation-hedge  property  of equity 
returns,  that interest-bearing  government  debt is therefore  a better  sub- 
stitute  for money than for real capital (or equity  claims  to real capital). 
Whether  or not the distinction  between real and nominal is the single 
most important  determinant  of relative  asset substitutabilities,  it clearly 
militates  in favor  of government  debt as a substitute  for money. 
Second, Leijonhufvud  and others have emphasized  the length of life 
or duration  of an asset as a primary  determinant  of asset-holding  prefer- 
ences in a world of uncertainty  and incomplete  contingent  futures  mar- 
kets.45  Stiglitz  and  others  have  usefully  formalized  the distinction  between 
"income  uncertainty"  on short-lived  claims  and "capital  uncertainty"  on 
long-lived  claims.46  Table 7 shows the maturity  distribution  of the U.S. 
government's  outstanding  interest-bearing  debt  as of the end  of 1977. The 
majority  of the debt had a maturity  of less than one year, and the mean 
maturity  of the total debt was 36.10 months.  These data cannot answer 
the traditional  question of whether government  bonds as a whole are 
closer  substitutes  for money  or capital.  Instead,  they  suggest  the implausi- 
bility of the assumption  that they are a perfect  substitute  for either  one 
45.  Axel Leijonhufvud,  On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes: 
A Study in Monetary Theory (Oxford University Press, 1968). The relevant  concept 
here is  not  the asset's maturity but its duration; see Michael H.  Hopewell and 
George G. Kaufman, "Bond Price Volatility and Term to Maturity: A Generalized 
Respecification,"  American Economic Review, vol. 63 (September 1973), pp. 749- 
53. At a yield of 6 percent a year, for example, a perpetuity has duration of about 
seventeen years. 
46.  J. E. Stiglitz, "A Consumption-Oriented  Theory of the Demand for Financial 
Assets and the Term Structure  of Interest Rates," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 
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and  therefore  indicate  that  the multiasset  model  developed  in the  previous 
section is a more fruitful  tool of analysis  than the two-asset  model that 
would result from aggregating  government  bonds with either  money or 
capital.  Moreover,  by showing  the great  diversity  of maturity  of the out- 
standing government  debts, the data raise the important  question of 
whether  it is appropriate  even to treat government  bonds as a single 
aggregate. 
CHOOSING  BETWEEN  CROWDING  OUT  AND  CROWDING  IN 
If government  bonds are sufficiently  heterogenous  that different  kinds 
of bonds are not perfect  substitutes  for one another  in the public's  port- 
folio, it is potentially  misleading  to work  with a model  that  treats  all such 
bonds  as identical.  Although  the best system  of disaggregation  for empiri- 
cal work on portfolio  behavior  remains  an open question,  a simple  dis- 
tinction  between  "short"  and "long"  maturities  is adequate  for analytical 
purposes  here. 
A four-asset  equivalent  to the symmetric  portfolio  demand  system  of 
l9is 
FMD1 -  I 
(31)  LD  so  -  J 
KD  -m  -s- 
-M2 - M3-m M  M2  Mg  m4  rM1 
+m2  -m2-  SS-S4  SS  S4  rs 
+  m3  S3  -m3-S3-14  14  rL 
_  M4  54  14  -m4-S4-l4  _rK 
+  y5  +  1b  W, 
L -m6-s6-j  Li-  11-  1 
where 
SD,  LD  =  the demands  for short-term  and  long-term  government  bonds 
rs,  rL  =  their respective expected returns 
mi,  si, 1, =  fixed  coefficients  as in  9.47 
Here the joint implication  of the balance-sheet  and symmetry  constraints 
47.  Note  that the coefficients  m4 and m5 now  have  different  meanings  than they 
did in equation  19, however. Benjamin  M. Friedman  633 
is that  it is possible  to specify  completely  the sixteen-element  matrix  with 
only six independent  coefficients.  For reasons  apparent  from  the analysis 
of the previous  section,  it is convenient  to do so in terms  of the six sub- 
stitution  coefficients.  Using 31 in place of 19 and  making  the correspond- 
ing change  in 13 leads to a four-equation  analog  to 21 through  23, which 
determines  the four  variables  Y, rs, rL,  and  rK. 
To consider  the portfolio  effect  of the bond financing  of a government 
deficit,  it is now necessary  to specify  whether  the bonds  issued  are short- 
term (dS =  dG) or long-term  (dL =  dG). The partial  derivatives  for 
asset-markets-only  comparable  to 25 and  26 can be easily  derived.  In the 
absence  of any further  restrictions,  the results  of solving  the system  show 
only that  under  short-term  financing  Or5/OG  >  0 while  OrL,OG  and  OrK! 
OG  are both of indeterminate  sign, and under  long-term  financing  Orr/ 
OG >  0 while OrK/OG  and Or5/OG  are of indeterminate  sign. Portfolio 
crowding  out or crowding  in is possible  under  either  short-  or long-term 
financing.  Any stronger  result  would  be surprising,  since so far the divid- 
ing line between  "short"  and  "long"  has not been specified.  The securities 
indicated  by S and L, respectively,  could be three-month  and six-month 
bills, or they could be twenty-year  and  thirty-year  bonds. 
The analysis  of the previous  section provides  a useful breakpoint  for 
distinguishing  short-term  from long-term  financing  of the deficit.  Here it 
is useful to think of "short-term"  bonds as closer substitutes  for money 
than  for capital,  and  of "long-term"  bonds  as closer  substitutes  for capital 
than for money. (Both such bonds need not necessarily  exist.) Once 
again,  the relative  substitutability  index  provides  a useful  metric  for decid- 
ing what "closeness"  means  in this context.  In particular,  under  further 
relative  substituability  conditions  that imply48 
(32)  (S7>  (7*>  -L, 
where  as and aL are the relative  substitutability  indexes  of the short-  and 
long-term  bonds,  defined  analogously  to 28 as 
(33)  (7s  =  -  '  L-  l- 
S4  14 
48. The  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for the results  stated  below  are 
m2 >  m  and  St  >  16 
Ss  is  S4  ko' 
which  together  imply ,  > a*, and 
M < m  and  Ss  S< 
St  so  14  k, 
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and  a* is the critical  value  now  defined  analogously  to 30 as 
(34)  or  =  m6-  ( 
M 
1 - me-  se-le\  Ic6' 
the results  of solving  the system  then also show that under  short-term  fi- 
nancing  OrK/OG  < 0, and  under  long-term  financing  OrK/OG  > 0. Financ- 
ing the deficit  with  a short-term  bond  characterized  by a relative  substitut- 
ability  index  greater  than  a*  causes  portfolio  crowding  in, while  financing 
the deficit with a long-term  bond characterized  by a relative  substitut- 
ability index smaller than a*  causes portfolio crowding  out. It is also 
possible to achieve similar  effects  using a pure debt-management  oper- 
ation without any change in spending (dS =  -dL;  dG =  0).  Given 32, 
replacing  long- by short-term  bonds causes  portfolio  crowding  in, while 
replacing  short- by long-term  bonds causes  portfolio  crowding  out. 
If there  existed  only one kind  of government  bond,  the conclusion  that 
there  is portfolio  crowding  out (crowding  in) according  to whether  that 
bond's  relative  substitutability  index is greater  (smaller) than  * would 
be no more than a restatement  of the relative  substitutability  condition 
of 29. Given the existence  of different  kinds of government  bonds with 
differing  substitution  properties,  however,  these conclusions  reveal the 
crucial  importance  of debt-management  policy in determining  the effects 
of fiscal  policy.  As long as there  exists-or  could  be created-at least  one 
kind of interest-bearing  government  debt instrument  characterized  by 
VO >  a*  and at least one kind characterized  by aL, <a*,  the government 
can choose whether  to have portfolio crowding  out or crowding  in ac- 
company  its deficit  spending.  Under  Leijonhufvud's  view  that  the relevant 
substitutabilities  depend  primarily  on the asset's  length  of life, the current 
range  of maturities  is probably  sufficient  for this purpose.  Alternatively, 
under  Tobin's  view  that  the distinction  between  nominal  and  real  denomi- 
nation  is of prime  importance,  there  may  be no U.S. government  debt  in- 
strument  capable  of producing  portfolio  crowding  out. If such an instru- 
ment did not exist, and if for some reason  portfolio  crowding  out were 
the objective  of policy, it could  be fulfilled  by the issuance  of an indexed 
security. 
Under what circumstances  would the government  want to use debt 
management  to influence  which  effect-portfolio crowding  out or crowd- 
ing in-results  from its deficit  financing,  and how much of the effect is 
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occur  if the relevant  empirical  magnitudes  indicated  that  portfolio  crowd- 
ing out would  offset  more  than  all of the intended  effect  of fiscal  policy  on 
income.  In the last diagram,  this  would  occur  if the conditional  LM curve 
shifted  so far leftward  that Y1  for a <  a* is less than Y0.  By contrast,  as 
long as crowding  out is less than  total (and especially  if crowding  in pre- 
vails), debt-management  policy would be irrelevant  if the sole objective 
of policy were the level of income.  The more  powerful  the crowding  out 
in that case, the more  the government  would  spend  to achieve  a given  de- 
sired  income.  Debt  management  would  not matter. 
When  policy is concerned  with both the level and the composition  of 
income,  however,  debt-management  policy  has a major  role to play along 
with fiscal  policy. While  fiscal  policy alone can raise  the level of income, 
in the absence  of accelerator  effects  it does so at the expense  of private 
investment.  Under  either  transactions  crowding  out or portfolio  crowding 
out, income increases  because each dollar of government  spending  re- 
places a smaller-though still strictly  positive-amount of private  invest- 
ment.  When  the long-term  benefits  of growth  and  productivity  associated 
with  capital formation are also  criteria for  policy,49  debt-management 
policy can minimize  the crowding  out (or maximize  the crowding  in) of 
investment  that  accompanies  any  given  level of income.  In sum,  the effect 
of debt-management  policy is to shift the trade-off  between  income  level 
and  composition  that  fiscal  policy  faces  under  an  unaccommodative  mone- 
tary  policy. 
In the context  of the poor recent  performance  of capital  formation  in 
the United  States,  it is interesting  to consider  the debt-management  policy 
now being used to finance  the continuing  large  deficits  shown  in table 1. 
Table 8 presents  data for the mean  maturity  of the U.S. Treasury's  out- 
standing  debt during  the era since World  War  II. Subject  to modest  fluc- 
tuation,  the dominant  trend  for three  decades  was toward  a shorter  mean 
maturity.  During the late 1960s, for example-a  period of unusually 
strong  investment  in plant and equipment-the mean maturity  fell espe- 
cially  rapidly.  Since  January  1976, however,  debt-management  policy  has 
shifted toward  sharply  lengthening  rather  than shortening  the debt. Al- 
though  the quantitative  effects cannot be estimated  on the basis of cur- 
rent  knowledge,  it is qualitatively  clear  that  U.S. debt-management  policy 
49.  Such effects, including also implications for price inflation, lie outside the 
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Table 8. Mean Maturity  of Outanding U.S. Treasury  Marketable  Securities, 
Selected  Periods,  1946-78 
Mean maturity  (months) 
Date 
(end  of  period)  Total  debt  Privately  held  debt 
1946  112.75  124.17 
1950  97.11  99.99 
1955  65.51  71.24 
1960  54.84  58.35 
1965  59.54  63.31 
1970  40.43  40.99 
1975  33.30  28.90 
January  1976  32.90  28.50 
June 1976  34.68  31.05 
December  1976  36.10  33.28 
June 1977  38.02  34.48 
December  1977  38.39  35.40 
June 1978  40.52  36.83 
August 1978  42.28  38.78 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
since 1975 has been counterproductive  from  the standpoint  of promoting 
capital  formation. 
ECONOMETRIC  EVIDENCE  ON  PORTFOLIO 
SUBSTITUTABILITIES 
A fundamental  implication  of the models used to analyze portfolio 
crowding  out or crowding  in, both  here  and  in the previous  section,  is that 
different  nonmoney  assets  are  not perfect  substitutes.  Hence the structure 
of relative  asset  yields  depends  upon (among  other  factors) relative  asset 
supplies. 
At the theoretical  level, the dependence  of asset  yields  on asset  supplies 
has been shown in a comparative  statics context  by Keynes and Hicks, 
and in a dynamic  context by Tobin.50  Culbertson  and Modigliani  and 
Sutch  have expanded  on this notion  under  the respective  labels "market 
segmentation"  and "preferred  habitat,"  and  Stiglitz  has clarified  how such 
50.  Keynes, General Theory; Hicks, "Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics"'; Tobin, 
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effects  follow directly  from investors'  risk aversion  (except under  highly 
restrictive  conditions  on the covariance  structure  of the returns  from  indi- 
vidual assets). l At the empirical  level, however,  for many years econ- 
omists'  efforts  to test for the effect  of asset  supplies  on yield relationships 
produced  meager  results  at best. The standard  time-series  test consisted 
of regressing  the observed  spread  between  long and short  yields directly 
on the relative amounts of outstanding  long- and short-term  treasury 
securities  or regressing  the long-term  yield directly  on short-term  yield 
and relative-supply  variables.  Such  tests rarely  showed  significant  supply 
effects.52  In large part as a consequence  of the accumulating  evidence 
from  these tests,  economists  began  to lose interest  in multiasset  models  in 
general,  and debt-management  policy in particular. 
In retrospect  it is possible  to identify  at least three  reasons  why such 
tests  failed  to find  evidence  for effects  of asset  supplies  on asset  yields,  all 
of which are related  to the unrestricted  reduced-form  methodology  that 
they  employed.  First,  these  tests  typically  focused  on "outside"  or govern- 
ment-issued  assets,  implicitly  relying  on the assumption  that intermedia- 
tion is irrelevant  for the structure  of relative  yields,  so that  "inside"  assets 
(that is, debt securities  issued by private  borrowers)  simply  netted  out. 
Second, the tests typically  used only aggregative  data (for example,  the 
total amount of outside assets held by all private investors), thereby 
assuming  implicitly  that heterogeneity  in portfolio  behavior  among  dif- 
ferent groups of investors  facing different  legal and institutional  con- 
straints is  also irrelevant for market-determined  yield relationships. 
Third, by using the direct reduced-form  approach  these tests could not 
impose restrictions  (even on aggregate  behavior) from the richly de- 
veloped  theory  of portfolio  choice. 
51. J. M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure  of Interest Rates," Quarterly  Jour- 
nal of Economics, vol. 71 (November 1957), pp. 485-517; Franco Modigliani and 
Richard Sutch, "Innovations  in Interest Rate Policy," American Economic Review, 
vol. 56 (May  1966), pp. 178-97; and Stiglitz, "A Consumption-Oriented  Theory." 
52.  See, for example, Franco Modigliani  and Richard  Sutch, "Debt Management 
and the Term Structure  of Interest Rates: An Empirical  Analysis of Recent Experi- 
ence," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 75 (August 1967, pt. 2),  pp. 569-89,  and 
Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations."  One study that was exceptional because it did 
find some evidence of asset supply effects was Arthur M. Okun, "Monetary  Policy, 
Debt Management and Interest Rates: A Quantitative  Appraisal,"  in Stabilization 
Policies, prepared  for the Commission on Money and Credit (Prentice-Hall, 1963), 
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More recently,  the seminal contribution  of Brainard  and Tobin has 
generated  renewed  empirical  efforts  to analyze  the asset-substitution  and 
other properties  of portfolio  behavior.  Such analyses  generally  estimate 
asset-demand  (and, in the context  of intermediation,  liability-supply)  re- 
lationships  analogous  to systems  19 and  31.53  To date,  the most  successful 
investigations  have  focused  on single,  well-defined  categories  of investors, 
such as life insurance  companies,  commercial  banks,  or the "household" 
sector  of the flow-of-funds  accounts.  To bring  evidence  from  such  models 
to bear  on issues  like those  under  discussion  here,  however,  it is necessary 
to have a fully simultaneous  model for all categories  of asset holders  in 
the economy. Alternatively,  one could estimate  a single system  like 31 
for the asset-holding  behavior  of the entire  private  sector. 
Because  only limited  success  was achieved  in estimating,  for use in this 
article, a five-asset  econometric  model for the aggregate  U.S. nonbank 
private  sector,  reliable  empirical  estimates  could  not be provided  here  for 
the key substitution  coefficients  that distinguish  portfolio crowding  out 
and  crowding  in.54  The  estimated  own-yield  elasticities  were  typically  posi- 
tive and significant,  and the estimated  cross-yield  elasticities  were (with 
one exception) either  negative  and significant  or insignificantly  different 
from zero. But the results  as a whole did not appear  to warrant  even the 
limited  confidence  that might  be placed in the money-demand  functions 
used for an analogous  purpose above. Given the likely importance  of 
intermediation  and investor  heterogeneity,  modest  results  for such a fully 
aggregated  no-intermediation  model are hardly  surprising.55 
In the absence  of such a model,  one must  hunt  elsewhere  for evidence 
on whether  different  nonmoney  assets  are indeed  imperfect  substitutes  in 
private  investors'  portfolios,  so that relative  asset supplies  do matter  for 
relative  asset yields as in the analytical  models  used above.  Research  us- 
ing structural  models  of portfolio  behavior  and the determination  of in- 
terest  rates  has  provided  such  evidence  in two forms,  corresponding  to the 
two elements  of the key proposition  in question.  First,  cross-yield  elastic- 
ities are  sufficiently  small  to indicate  highly  imperfect  substitution  among 
53.  Brainard  and Tobin, "Pitfalls." 
54. The five assets were money, time deposits, short-term treasury securities, 
long-term  treasury  securities,  and equities. 
55. The  complete  estimates, together  with  a  description of  the  estimation 
methodology, are available from the author on request. Benjamin  M. Friedman  639 
nonmoney  assets.56  Second, this research  has found strong  evidence of 
asset-supply  effects  on relative  asset yields for several  specific  markets.57 
In sum, although  future  research  might  lead to satisfactory  estimates  of 
the key substitution  parameters  that  determine  conditions  like 29 and 32, 
even the limited  evidence  now available  appears  to deny the assumption 
of perfect (or nearly perfect) substitutability  of nonmoney  assets that 
would preclude portfolio crowding in  and render debt-management 
policy irrelevant. 
SUMMARY 
Several  useful conclusions  about the effects  of debt-financed  govern- 
ment deficits  emerge  from extending  the analysis  to take account  of the 
observed  heterogeneity  within the single-asset  category  of "government 
bonds." 
The nominal  returns  on government  debt instruments,  together  with 
their  relatively  short  average  maturity,  suggest  strongly  that they are not 
perfect  substitutes  for real capital.  They do not appear  to be perfect  sub- 
stitutes  for money  either,  however. 
The range of  different  maturities  actually or potentially available 
strongly  suggests  that all government  debt instruments  are not even per- 
fect substitutes  for one another.  It is the government's  prerogative  of 
choosing  among  them  that facilitates  debt-management  policy. 
As long as there  exists (or could be created) at least one government 
debt instrument  (a short-term  bond) with  a relative  substitutability  index 
56.  See Benjamin M. Friedman, "Financial Flow Variables and the Short-Run 
Determination  of Long-Term  Interest Rates,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85 
(August 1977),  pp. 661-89;  and Roley, "A Structural Model." Other researchers 
have found similar evidence for imperfect substitutability  among liquid assets; see, 
for example, R. W. Kopcke, "U.S. Household Sector Demand for Liquid Financial 
Assets, 1959-1970," Journal of  Monetary Economics, vol.  3  (October 1977),  pp. 
409-41. 
57.  See Friedman, "Financial Flow Variables,"  on the corporate bond market, 
and  Roley,  "A  Structural Model," on  markets for  short and intermediate-term 
treasury  notes and long-term  treasury  bonds. Other  researchers  have found evidence 
for asset-supply  effects in models that encompass more asset markets but are less 
specific about the nature of the asset substitutions  involved; see, for example, Barry 
Bosworth and James S. Duesenberry, "A Flow of Funds Model and Its Implica- 
tions," in Issues in Federal Debt Management (Federal Reserve Bank of  Boston, 
1973), pp. 39-147; and Patric H. Hendershott, Understanding  Capital Markets, vol. 
1: A Flow-of-Funds  Financial  Model (Heath, 1977). 640  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
greater  than the key ratio of the respective  wealth responses  of money 
and capital  and at least one (a long-term  bond) less than  the ratio,  debt- 
management  policy can determine  which effect-portfolio crowding  out 
or crowding  in-results  from financing  deficits,  and how much. Long- 
term  financing  leads to crowding  out, while short-term  financing  leads  to 
crowding  in. 
The most important  role for debt-management  policy is to shift the 
trade-off  between  raising  total income and reducing  private  investment 
that  is faced  by fiscal  policymakers  under  an unaccommodative  monetary 
policy. Viewed  in this context,  the change  in U.S. debt-management  pol- 
icy that  began  after  1975 has  been counterproductive  from  the standpoint 
of promoting  capital  formation. 
The available  empirical  evidence  does not support  the contention  that 
familiar  nonmoney  assets-like  bonds and equities  or short- and long- 
term bonds-are  perfect substitutes.  Hence portfolio crowding  in can 
occur,  and debt-management  policy does matter. 
Conclusions  for Fiscal,  Debt-Management,  and  Monetary  Policies 
The principal  conclusion of this article-that  the consequences  of 
bond financing (and of transactions  crowding  out)  do not appear as 
damaging  for expansionary  fiscal policy as previous analysis  has indi- 
cated-suggests that the assessment  of fiscal  policy actions should start 
with  the behavior  of the real  sector  rather  than  that  of the financial  sector. 
Offsets  from the shift or slope of the LM curve  need not vitiate  the effi- 
cacy of fiscal policy. Rather,  both the availability  of real resources  to 
meet additional  demand  for real spending  and the likelihood  of an in- 
duced expansion  of productive  capacity  constitute  potentially  more re- 
strictive  conditions  for effective  fiscal stimulation.  Practical  analysis  for 
policymaking  purposes  is even more difficult  because  most of the avail- 
able evidence  indicates  that  both the response  of price  inflation  to aggre- 
gate demand  pressure  and the response  of fixed investment  to anticipa- 
tions of changing  rates of return  involve substantial  time lags. Deciding 
the case for or against  fiscal  stimulation  on a race between  inflation  and 
the accelerator  is a crude,  but  not altogether  inaccurate,  conceptualization 
of the problem.  If fiscal  policy is necessarily  ineffective  in a given situa- 
tion, it is likely to be so because  of those effects  in the goods market  and Benjamin  M. Friedman  641 
not because  of problems  caused  in the financial  markets  by an excess  sup- 
ply of bonds. 
The second  conclusion  is that debt  management,  despite  the lack of at- 
tention  paid  to it in almost  any  recent  discussion  of macroeconomic  policy, 
is an essential  part of the story. The portfolio  behavior  that follows the 
issuance  of government  bonds need not vitiate  the intended  effect  of fis- 
cal policy, although  under  improper  debt-management  policy it almost 
certainly  can. The case for or against  lengthening  the average  maturity  of 
the  U.S. public  debt,  as the  Treasury  has  recently  done,  rests  on arguments 
that  lie well beyond  the scope of this article.  What  does seem clear,  how- 
ever, is that the recent  period,  which  has witnessed  extraordinarily  large 
federal deficits  and a sluggish  recovery  of capital spending,  has been a 
particularly  unpropitious  time  for such  a debt-restructuring  program.  The 
Treasury  should  be meeting  its financing  requirements  during  this period 
in such a way that it denies, not satisfies,  the demands  of investors  for 
long-term  securities,  thereby stimulating  the public to tum to the cor- 
porate  business  sector  for more  new issues.  The fact that  the Treasury  has 
been able to issue its long-term  bonds without  causing  "indigestion"  in 
the debt markets  is beside the point. The objective  of debt-management 
policy should  have been to keep the market  hungry  for long-term  assets, 
not merely  to avoid  overfeeding  it. 
It is useful to recall that this entire  analysis  has proceeded  on the as- 
sumption  of a strictly  unaccommodative  monetary  policy. This need not 
be the case;  in practice  the Federal  Reserve  System  has often adopted  at 
least a partially  accommodative  stance  in the face of a decision  by Con- 
gress and the executive  branch  to pursue  a policy of fiscal  stimulation.  A 
responsive  monetary  policy would have a major impact on the issues 
analyzed  here  in two ways.  First,  increasing  the money  stock  would  cause 
an expansionary  shift in the LM curve. Second, even with no change 
in monetary  growth,  the Federal  Reserve  can influence  the economic  con- 
sequences  of debt-financed  fiscal  policy by the simultaneous  purchase  of 
long and  sale of short  treasury  securities  (or vice versa) through  its open- 
market  operations.  Although only the Treasury  can design and issue a 
new security  (such as an indexed  bond or a perpetuity),  the Federal  Re- 
serve's  portfolio  is sufficiently  large to exert a substantial  impact  on the 
composition  of the outstanding  securities  issued  by the Treasury.  If debt- 
management  policy  fails to pursue  a path  consistent  with  the objectives  of 
fiscal  policy, monetary  policy can provide  a satisfactory  surrogate. 